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A R T I C L E S
Improving Water Quality 
Antidegradation Policies
Sandra Zellmer and Robert L . Glicksman*
The visual images that helped spur the enactment of the nation’s foundational environmental laws during the 1970s, including the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),1 
were largely of contaminated resources, such as burning riv-
ers and oil-soaked seagulls .2 Similarly, evocative prose, such 
as Rachel Carson’s description of the “strange blight”3 afflict-
ing America in the 1960s as a result of the use of chemi-
cal pesticides, played a critical role in alerting policymakers 
and the public to the need for new legal protections for 
public health and the environment . Over the years, similar 
depictions of the environmental devastation resulting from 
unconstrained economic activity have continued to play an 
important role in creating the momentum for the adoption 
of new or strengthened environmental laws .4
1 . Clean Water Act of 1972 (“CWA”), Pub . L . No . 92-500, 86 Stat . 816 (codified 
as amended at 33 U .S .C . §§ 1251–1376 (2006)) .
2 . See Richard J . Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 59 (2004) 
(describing “visually unsettling events” such as the smoldering Cuyahoga River 
and “seagulls suffocated in oil as a result of the Santa Barbara oil spill) .
3 . Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin 1994), quoted in Robert 
L . Glicksman et al ., Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 18 (6th 
ed . 2011) .
4 . See, e.g., Martha L . Judy & Katherine N . Probst, Superfund at 30, 11 Vt . 
J . Envtl . L . 191, 192–93 (2009) (describing “sites regularly featured on the 
television news and in news magazines in the late 1970s and early 1980s [that] 
set the stage for passage of Superfund,” including the “‘Valley of the Drums,’ 
[which] imprinted on the screen and in the minds of the American public 
colorful images of erupting, smoking, seeping, and corroding drums”); Tina 
M . Smith, Wildlife Protection and Offshore Drilling: Can There Be a Balance 
Between the Two?, 6 Fla . A&M U . L . Rev . 349, 366 (2011) (quoting, Prince 
William’s Oily Mess: A Tale of Recovery, NOAA Ocean Serv . Educ ., http://
oceanservice .noaa .gov/education/stories/oilymess/oily01_infamous .html) (last 
updated Mar . 25, 2008)) (“The images Americans saw on television and the 
descriptions they heard over the radio [after the Exxon Valdez oil spill] were 
Environmental law, however, has always been about more 
than just repairing the damage wrought by past environmen-
tal disasters or mismanagement . Senator Edmund Muskie, 
the principal sponsor of the CWA, for example, was moved 
to action not only by the environmental despoliation he wit-
nessed, but also by “[t]he beauties of nature   .   .   .  in almost 
pristine form” at which he marveled while growing up .5 The 
nation’s environmental laws were adopted as much to pre-
serve superior environmental quality as to restore damaged 
or degraded resources .6
The CWA reflects this dual conception of the function 
of environmental law . Its principal goals are “to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of 
the nation’s surface water bodies .7 The Act’s adoption was 
spurred largely by the realization that unchecked pollution 
had caused the degradation of those waters, making them 
unsuitable for uses such as fishing and swimming .8 At the 
time Congress passed the statute, however, some lakes, rivers, 
and streams had water quality that was better than what was 
needed to support these uses .9 An important question was 
whether the statute would limit discharges with the potential 
to impair these high-quality waters . The U .S . Environmen-
tal Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) antidegradation policy pro-
vided an affirmative answer .10 Yet, the CWA’s maintenance 
goal has taken a decided backseat to its restoration goal, as 
of heavily oiled shorelines, dead and dying wildlife and thousands of workers 
mobilized to clean beaches .”) .
5 . Robert F . Blomquist, “To Stir Up Public Interest”: Edmund S. Muskie and the 
U.S. Senate Special Subcommittee’s Water Pollution Investigations and Legisla-
tive Activities, 1963–66—A Case Study in Early Congressional Environmental 
Policy Development, 22 Colum . J . Envtl . L . 1, 6 (1997) (quoting Edmund S . 
Muskie, Journeys 79–80 (1972)) .
6 . See, e.g., The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U .S .C . § 1131(a) (2006) (enunciat-
ing Congress’s goal of administering wilderness areas “in such manner as will 
leave them unimpaired for the future use and preservation as wilderness, so 
as to provide for the protection of these areas [and] the preservation of their 
wilderness character”) .
7 . CWA § 101(a), 33 U .S .C . § 1251(a) (2006) (emphasis added) .
8 . N . William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the 
Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 Iowa L . Rev . 643, 
658 (1977) .
9 . See id . (showing that state standards previously permitted degradation of high-
quality waters) .
10 . Id . at 662 .
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both the paucity of statutory text on antidegradation issues11 
and the emphasis of federal and state implementation on 
improving the quality of impaired waters attest .12
This Article focuses on the CWA’s relatively neglected 
maintenance aspects . It assesses whether the statute’s anti-
degradation policy for protecting superior water quality has 
fostered the statutory maintenance goal . Part I traces the his-
tory of the antidegradation policy and analyzes the rationales 
for precluding the degradation of high-quality environmental 
resources . The objectives of, and justifications for, preventing 
the deterioration of high-quality resources are best illustrated 
by comparing the antidegradation program adopted under 
the CWA with the version adopted under the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”), which is the most elaborate antidegradation pro-
gram in domestic federal pollution control legislation . Part 
II assesses whether the CWA’s antidegradation mechanisms 
have succeeded in promoting the goals of a well-functioning 
environmental quality maintenance program, identifying 
several flaws in the CWA program’s design and implemen-
tation . Part III compares the CWA’s antidegradation policy 
to nonimpairment and nondegradation mandates under the 
nation’s public natural resource management statutes .
Based on this comparative analysis, and the past four 
decades of experience with the CWA, Part IV recommends 
four reforms to strengthen the CWA’s antidegradation pol-
icy . First, we recommend a federal regulation requiring all 
states to designate high-quality waters within their borders 
for the highest level of protection against degradation of 
water quality, including waters within parks and wildlife 
refuges . We also support requiring states to take concrete 
steps to restore the quality of degraded high quality or excep-
tional waters so that they can support a full suite of beneficial 
uses and ecosystem services . Second, the CWA’s antidegra-
dation program should preclude water quality impairment 
that either results in loss or threatened loss of an existing 
or potentially viable use—especially fishing, swimming, and 
higher uses—or adversely affects the ecological resilience of 
the affected water body . Third, we support extending the 
scope of antidegradation requirements to cover sources that 
are exempt in many states, such as nonpoint sources that 
create polluted runoff . Finally, the CWA’s antidegradation 
program should include mandatory planning and assessment 
responsibilities, particularly as applied to the highest quality 
waters . These reforms would help fulfill the objectives of an 
antidegradation program, move the nation closer to the goal 
of ensuring the integrity of our surface waters, and help the 
CWA function as more than just a rudimentary pollution 
control regime .
I. The History, Structure, and Goals of the 
Antidegradation Program
Federal efforts to prevent degradation of water quality pre-
date the adoption of the CWA . Congress endorsed these 
efforts in the CWA, although the cryptic manner in which 
11 . Id . at 673 .
12 . Id . at 674 .
it did left the scope and content of the resulting antidegrada-
tion program unclear .13 This Part reviews the history of fed-
eral efforts to prevent degradation of water resources and the 
structure of the current regulatory program . It also describes 
the goals of federal antidegradation provisions, which are 
reflected not only in the CWA, but also in the CAA’s preven-
tion of significant deterioration program . Because this Article 
measures the success of the CWA’s antidegradation program 
against the overarching justifications for antidegradation 
programs generally, the objectives of the CAA’s prevention 
of significant deterioration program are just as relevant to an 
assessment of the CWA program as are the stated goals of the 
CWA itself .14 In short, the parallels between the CAA and 
CWA approaches to antidegradation “are absolutely clear .”15
A.	 The	History	of	Federal	Antidegradation	Programs	
in	Water	Pollution	Control
Before EPA’s creation in 1970, the Department of the Inte-
rior adopted guidelines to implement the 1965 Water Qual-
ity Act,16 which required all states to adopt water quality 
standards consisting of use designations (such as drinking 
or fishing) and water quality characteristics needed to per-
mit those uses to occur .17 The guidelines provided that “[i]n 
no case will standards providing for less than existing water 
quality be acceptable,” and required that standards provide 
for “[t]he maintenance and protection of quality and use or 
uses of water now of a higher quality or of a quality suitable 
for present and potential uses .”18 Enforcement of the guide-
lines was cursory, however .19
In 1968, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall endorsed the 
policy of preventing degradation of existing clean water 
resources,20 but retreated from the absolute protection of 
13 . Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub . L . No . 95-217, 91 Stat . 1566 (1977) .
14 . The relevance of the goals of preventing degradation of one environmental 
medium to efforts to protect a different resource is reflected in the adoption of 
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1970 . As indicated below at notes 16–24 and 
accompanying text, by that time, the Department of the Interior had already 
adopted an antidegradation program for water pollution . The Nixon Adminis-
tration advanced the policy rationales that supported Interior’s water program 
when it supported the adoption of a protection against “backsliding” in the 
proposed air pollution legislation . See William H . Rodgers, Environmental 
Law: Air and Water 351 (1986) . Cf . Oliver A . Houck, The Clean Water 
Act TMDL Program: Law, Policy, and Implementation 192 (1999) (not-
ing that once the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) “thought its 
way through the mechanics of meeting [the] statutory goals” of CAA programs 
like the prevention of significant deterioration program, the agency had the 
opportunity to “ratify” these goals in other statutory contexts, including the 
CWA’s water quality standards program) .
15 . Jeffrey Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 Ala . L . 
Rev . 651, 663 n .72 (2004) [hereinafter Gaba, New Growth] (noting the “lack 
of detail in the CWA  .  .  . in sharp contrast with” the “well-established require-
ments” of the CAA’s prevention of significant deterioration program) .
16 . Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub . L . No . 89-234, 79 Stat . 903 (1965) .
17 . Id . at 908 .
18 . Hines, supra note 8, at 658 (quoting Fed . Water Pollution Control Ad-
min ., U .S . Dep’t of Interior, Guidelines for Establishing Water Qual-
ity Standards for Interstate Waters 5, 7 (1966)) .
19 . See Mary A . Stitts, Note, The Ever-Changing Balance of Power in Interstate Water 
Pollution: Do Affected States Have Anything to Say After Arkansas v . Oklahoma?, 
50 Wash . & Lee L . Rev . 1341, 1356 (1993) .
20 . Lauren Kalisek, The Principle of Antidegradation and Its Place in Texas Water 
Quality Permitting, 41 Tex . Envtl . L .J . 1, 5 (2010) . See also Jeffrey M . Gaba, 
Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 
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existing water quality reflected in the 1966 guidelines .21 The 
Secretary’s policy required maintenance of waters whose 
quality was better than established standards unless a state 
could justify degradation based on necessary economic or 
social development . Still, the policy did not allow degrada-
tion to interfere with current designated uses or uses that 
could be made of those waters .22
Despite the weakening of the 1966 guidelines, state 
governors and the U .S . Chamber of Commerce com-
plained that an antidegradation policy would unreasonably 
restrict economic development, and state enforcement of 
the guidelines continued to lag .23 By the time Congress 
adopted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 (now known as the CWA), the water quality 
standards of all fifty states nominally included versions of 
an antidegradation policy statement . In most states, how-
ever, protection against degradation was little more than an 
unimplemented objective .24
The 1972 law did not expressly include an antidegradation 
policy .25 EPA, which took control over federal water quality 
programs created in 1972, subsequently argued that such a 
policy was “consistent with the spirit, intent, and goals of the 
Act,” especially the goal of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters .”26 EPA refined the policy in 1975, creating 
the requirements that, with few changes, remain in place 
today .27 In 1987, Congress cryptically addressed antidegra-
dation of water quality for the first time, providing that for 
waters whose quality exceeds levels necessary to protect the 
designated use, any effluent limitation based on a total maxi-
mum daily load (“TMDL”)28 may be revised only if the revi-
sion “is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation 
36 Vand . L . Rev . 1167, 1189–90 (1983) [hereinafter Gaba, Federal Supervi-
sion]; Michael C . Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean 
Water, 33 Envtl . L . 79, 104 (2003) .
21 . Hines, supra note 8, at 659 .
22 . Kalisek, supra note 20, at 5–6 . See Water Quality Standards Regulation, 40 
Fed . Reg . 55334, 55340 (Nov . 28, 1975) (codified at 40 C .F .R . pt . 130) .
23 . Michael Snyder, Note, Nondegradation of Water Quality: The Need for Effective 
Action, 50 Notre Dame L . Rev . 890, 893, 897 (1975) .
24 . Hines, supra note 8, at 659–60 .
25 . Snyder, supra note 23, at 895 .
26 . CWA § 101(a), 33 U .S .C . § 1251(a) (2006) . See U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 
Questions and Answers on Antidegradation 1 (1985) [hereinafter Ques-
tions & Answers], available at http://water .epa .gov/scitech/swguidance/stan-
dards/upload/2006_12_01_standards_antidegqa .pdf .
27 . Antidegradation Policy, 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12 (2011) . EPA amended the policy 
in 1983 . It created a limited exception for temporary or short-term changes in 
water quality in Outstanding National Resource Waters (“ONRW”), which 
previously had been protected from all degradation . John Harleston, What Is 
Antidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?, 5 S .C . Envtl . L .J . 33, 47 (1996) . 
EPA made this change because it “was concerned that waters which properly 
could have been designated as ONRW were not so designated because of the 
flat no degradation provision, and therefore were not being given special pro-
tection .” Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed . Reg . 51400, 51402 
(Nov . 8, 1983) (to be codified at 40 C .F .R . pts . 35, 120, 131) . See also Robert 
L . Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands II: Water Pollution, 12 UCLA J . 
Envtl . L . & Pol’y 61, 83 (1993); John L . Horwich, Water Quality Nondegra-
dation in Montana: Is Any Deterioration Too Much?, 14 Pub . Land L . Rev . 145, 
158–60 (1993) .
28 . A total maximum daily load (“TMDL”) is the maximum aggregate pollution 
loading that the receiving water is capable of assimilating without violating ap-
plicable water quality standards by creating excessive pollutant concentrations 
or interfering with designated uses . Glicksman et al ., supra note 3, at 627 .
policy established under this section .”29 The statute, which 
still governs antidegradation policy, simply incorporates by 
reference EPA’s prior administrative policy .30
B.	 The	Structure	of	the	Antidegradation	Program
An antidegradation policy is a required component of the 
water quality standards that states must adopt and enforce .31 
EPA regulations require the states to include three elements in 
their antidegradation policies .32 First, existing instream uses, 
and the level of water quality necessary to protect those uses, 
must be maintained and protected—state standards must be 
“sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable 
waters, preventing their further degradation .”33 Second, the 
state must maintain water quality that exceeds levels necessary 
to support recreation and the propagation of fish and wildlife 
unless allowing lower water quality is necessary to accommo-
date important economic or social development .34 Even then, 
water quality standards must fully protect existing uses .35 In 
addition, the state must assure achievement of the highest stat-
utory and regulatory requirements for all point sources36 and 
all cost-effective and reasonable best management practices for 
nonpoint sources .37 Third, the state must maintain quality in 
high-quality waters that constitute an “outstanding National 
resource,” including waters of national and state parks and 
wildlife refuges and waters of “exceptional recreational or eco-
logical significance .”38 In short, the policy requires different 
levels of protection for three types, or tiers, of waters .39 Under 
29 . CWA § 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2006) .
30 . Gaba, New Growth, supra note 15, at 672 .
31 . PUD No . 1 of Jefferson Cnty . v . Wash . Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U .S . 700, 718–
19 (1994) .
32 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a) . According to one court, the requirement to adopt an 
antidegradation policy does not apply to CWA permitting programs adminis-
tered by federal agencies . City of Olmsted Falls v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 435 
F .3d 632, 637 (6th Cir . 2005) (finding antidegradation policy inapplicable to 
federal issuance of dredge and fill permits) . The CWA provides, however, that 
all federal agencies must comply with state water quality standards, including 
a state’s antidegradation policy . CWA § 313(a), 33 U .S .C . § 1323(a) (2006); 
Idaho Sporting Cong . v . Thomas, 137 F .3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir . 1998) .
33 . PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty., 511 U .S . at 705 . See also Questions & Answers, 
supra note 26, at 3 (stating that “no activity is allowable  .  .  . which could par-
tially or completely eliminate any existing use”) .
34 . 40 C .F .R . §  131 .12(a)(2) . Aside from an unrealistic no discharge goal, the 
CWA’s primary goal is to achieve, wherever attainable, “water quality which 
provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and 
provides for recreation in and on the water  .  .  .  .” CWA § 101(a)(2), 33 U .S .C . 
§ 1251(a)(2) (2006) .
35 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a)(1) .
36 . A point source is defined under the CWA to include “any discernible, con-
fined and discrete conveyance,” such as a pipe . CWA § 502(14), 33 U .S .C . 
§ 1362(14) (2006) . Any source of water pollution that is not a point source is 
a nonpoint source, which generates diffuse pollution that creates runoff into 
surface water bodies . Glicksman et al ., supra note 3, at 593, 684–85 .
37 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a)(2) .
38 . Id . at § 131 .12(a)(3) (2011) .
39 . EPA has endorsed the adoption by some states of an additional tier, Tier 2 .5, 
that protects waters to a greater degree than Tier 2 but not as much as Tier 3 . 
Tier 2 .5 waters require “a very high level of water quality protection with-
out precluding unforeseen future economic and social development consid-
erations .” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v . Browner, 127 F .3d 1126, 1127 (D .C . Cir . 
1997) (describing Tier 2 .5 protection for Lake Michigan) (quoting U .S . En-
vtl . Prot . Agency, EPA-838-B-12-002, Water Quality Standards Hand-
book § 4 .2, at 4-2 (2d ed . 1994), available at http://water .epa .gov/scitech/
swguidance/standards/handbook/index .cfm) . See also Ohio Valley Envtl . Coal . 
v . Horinko, 279 F . Supp . 2d 732, 773–74 (S .D . W . Va . 2003) (approving in 
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Tier 1, existing uses must be maintained in all waters .40 Under 
Tier 2—high-quality waters that exceed fishable/swimmable 
quality—degradation will be allowed only if it is necessary 
to accommodate important social or economic development 
in the region .41 Degradation of water quality is completely 
prohibited for Tier 3, Outstanding National Resource Waters 
(“ONRW”),42 although “temporary and short-term changes” 
in water quality to accommodate important economic uses are 
allowed .43 Thus, the policy is designed to protect both existing 
uses and existing water quality, but in different circumstances . 
The Tier 1 provisions are directed at the protection of existing 
uses, while the Tier 2 component aims to protect the quality 
of high-quality waters .44 Tier 3 also protects water quality .45
The antidegradation policy affects states administering 
the CWA and discharging sources in several ways . States 
must review and, if appropriate, revise their water quality 
standards at least once every three years .46 Any such revi-
sions must comply with the antidegradation policy .47 If a 
state fails to adopt an adequate antidegradation policy, EPA 
must adopt one for the state .48 If a state issues a discharge 
permit for a point source that violates the antidegradation 
policy, then EPA may veto the permit .49 EPA may also reject 
TMDLs that violate the policy .50
In addition, the CWA requires those seeking a federal 
license or permit for an activity that may result in a discharge 
(such as the operation of a hydropower plant or the filling of 
wetlands) to provide a certification that the discharge will 
comply with state water quality standards .51 Without such 
a certification, the federal agency may not issue the license 
part and disapproving in part West Virginia’s provisions for Tier 2 .5) . “Because 
Tier 2 .5 is not required by EPA regulations, the only restriction on [a state’s] 
Tier 2 .5 standards is that they not fall below the minimum standards set for 
Tier 2 .” Id . at 773 .
40 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, supra note 39, at 4-1 .
41 . Id .
42 . Kalisek, supra note 20, at 9 . See also Columbus & Franklin Cnty . Metro . Park 
Dist . v . Shank, 600 N .E .2d 1042, 1055–56 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to equate 
degradation of existing water quality with an interference with an existing use 
for purposes of application of Ohio’s antidegradation rules to high-quality wa-
ters, and rejecting state agency’s application of a technological approach that 
limited pollutants to a level consistent with water quality criteria for exception-
al waters because “the analysis proceeds from a false premise that the applicable 
water quality standard is determined by the use designation rather than the 
antidegradation policy .”) .
43 . Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed . Reg . at 51403; U .S . Envtl . 
Prot . Agency, supra note 39, at 4-10 .
44 . Gaba, Federal Supervision, supra note 20, at 1,192 .
45 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, supra note 39, at 4-1 .
46 . CWA § 303(c)(1), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(c)(1) (2006) .
47 . CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(c)(2)(A) .
48 . CWA § 303(c)(4), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(c)(4); Raymond Proffitt Found . v . U .S . 
Envtl . Prot . Agency, 930 F . Supp . 2d 1088, 1098 (E .D . Pa . 1996) (holding that 
EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to issue a federal antidegradation program 
for a state with a deficient program) . Cf . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla . 
v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 105 F .3d 599 (5th Cir . 1997) (holding that dis-
trict court improperly dismissed CWA citizen suit alleging that EPA violated 
nondiscretionary duty to determine whether state changes to water quality 
standards violated CWA requirements, including the antidegradation policy) . 
But cf . Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v . Browner, 127 F .3d 1126, 1126 (D .C . Cir . 1997) 
(holding that EPA did not have nondiscretionary duty to review and evaluate 
existing state water quality standards retained after a state’s triennial review) .
49 . CWA § 402(d), 33 U .S .C . § 1342(d) (2006) .
50 . Questions & Answers, supra note 26, at 2 .
51 . CWA § 401(a), 33 U .S .C . § 1341(a) (2006) .
or permit .52 Activities covered by this requirement include 
discharges requiring a CWA permit in a state in which EPA, 
rather than a state, administers the permit program .53 If a 
state’s certification for an EPA-issued discharge permit fails 
to comply with the antidegradation policy, then EPA may add 
more stringent effluent limitations to ensure compliance .54
C.	 The	Goals	of	Antidegradation	Programs
The reasons to mandate the improvement of inferior quality 
natural resources are relatively obvious, and include ensur-
ing that exposure to, or use of, those resources does not 
adversely affect public health, destroy critical wildlife or fish 
populations, or otherwise disrupt ecosystem functions .55 By 
contrast, no single goal explains legal mandates to prevent 
degradation of superior quality resources . Instead, antideg-
radation programs rest on a variety of rationales that tend 
to be relevant without regard to the environmental medium 
involved, including the desire to provide a margin of safety 
to offset the risk that regulations will not provide the desired 
level of protection, protect special value natural resources, 
prevent the movement of industry to areas with superior 
environmental quality, prevent interstate pollution, and pre-
serve opportunities for future economic growth .56 The CWA 
and CAA, which contain the best known antidegradation 
programs among the pollution control laws, both illustrate 
these justifications for preventing degradation of high-
quality resources, and the justifications advanced in support 
of both the CWA and CAA programs provide appropriate 
yardsticks for evaluating any antidegradation effort .57
52 . Id . See Islander E . Pipeline Co . v . McCarthy, 525 F .3d 141 (2d Cir . 2008) 
(upholding denial of state certification for natural gas pipeline on ground 
that backfill discharge would violate state’s antidegradation policy); FPL En-
ergy Maine Hydro LLC v . Dep’t of Envtl . Prot ., 926 A .2d 1197 (Me . 2007) 
(dam and reservoir facilities not exempt from antidegradation policy); Pub . 
Util . Dist . No . 1 v . Dep’t of Ecology, 51 P .3d 744 (Wash . 2002) (holding 
that § 101(g) of the CWA did not preclude state environmental agency from 
imposing minimum streamflow requirements in water quality certification on 
holder of state water rights) . But cf . Great Basin Mine Watch v . Hankins, 456 
F .3d 955, 964 (9th Cir . 1996) (“The antidegradation policy only refers to water 
quality standards and does not refer to water withdrawal .”) . Federal agencies 
may have the power to impose conditions on licensees that are more protective 
of water quality than a state certification . See, e.g., Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v . 
Fed . Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 545 F .3d 1207 (9th Cir . 2008) .
53 . Arkansas v . Oklahoma, 503 U .S . 91 (1992) . Most states have received EPA 
approval to administer at least portions of the Clean Water Act’s National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System permit program . State Program Status, 
U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, http://cfpub .epa .gov/npdes/statestats .cfm (last 
updated Apr . 14, 2003) .
54 . Questions & Answers, supra note 26, at 2 .
55 . CWA § 101(a)(2), 33 U .S .C . § 1251(a)(2) (2006) .
56 . See, e.g., Craig N . Oren, The Protection of Parklands From Increased Air Pollu-
tion: A Look at Current Policy, 13 Harv . Envtl . L . Rev . 313, 315–16 (1989) 
[hereinafter Oren, Parklands] .
57 . Other federal pollution control laws seek to prevent degradation of existing en-
vironmental quality less directly, by incorporating the antidegradation regimes 
established under other laws instead of creating independent requirements . 
See, e.g., 40 C .F .R . §  265 .193(g)(2)(iii)(D) (2011) (Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act regulations requiring EPA, in issuing variances from hazard-
ous waste management requirements, to consider the potential adverse effects 
of a release on surface water quality, taking into account water quality stan-
dards, including the antidegradation policy, established for surface waters in 
the area of the affected facility) . Similarly, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act provides that if any requirement 
under a federal law such as the CWA is “legally applicable to” a hazardous 
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1.	 Providing	a	Margin	of	Safety
The CAA and the CWA both require the adoption of ambi-
ent quality standards to provide a minimally acceptable level 
of environmental quality . The CAA requires that EPA adopt 
primary standards, which are necessary to protect the pub-
lic health with an adequate margin of safety, and second-
ary standards, which protect the public welfare from known 
or anticipated adverse effects associated with air pollution .58 
The CWA requires states to adopt water quality standards 
that assure that pollutant concentrations will not exceed lev-
els that will impair designated uses .59 Both sets of standards 
establish maximum permissible concentrations of pollutants 
in the air or water, respectively .60
Environmental regulation often proceeds in the face of 
scientific uncertainty . As a result, regulators may determine 
that a particular concentration level is sufficient to achieve 
the desired level of protection, only to discover later that 
adverse effects occur at lower pollution concentrations than 
once believed . Antidegradation rules can protect against 
such misjudgments .61
One of the purposes of the CAA’s Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (“PSD”) program is to protect public health 
“from any actual or potential adverse effect which in [EPA’s] 
judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air 
pollution  .  .  . notwithstanding attainment and maintenance 
of all national ambient air quality standards .”62 Legislators in 
1977 were skeptical of regulators’ ability to identify harmless 
concentrations of air pollution and suspected that the only 
way to eliminate health risks would be to set ambient stan-
dards at zero .63 Not willing to go that far, legislative support-
ers of the PSD program sought to minimize risk by keeping 
pollutant concentrations lower than required by air quality 
standards in areas that already had clean air .64 In this way, 
the program would provide a “margin of safety” if pollu-
tion actually caused harm at concentrations lower than any 
threshold levels identified by EPA, or if EPA refused, for eco-
nomic or political reasons, to tighten the standards despite 
new evidence that existing standards were not sufficiently 
substance release or is “relevant and appropriate under the circumstances of 
the release,” then the remedial action selected by EPA must comply with that 
requirement . At a minimum, the action must attain relevant and appropri-
ate water quality criteria found in CWA water quality standards . 42 U .S .C . 
§ 9621(d)(2)(A) (2006) . For a case holding that a state groundwater antideg-
radation law was “legally applicable or relevant and appropriate” to a cleanup, 
but upholding EPA’s implicit waiver of that law, see United States v. Akzo Coat-
ings of Am., Inc., 949 F .3d 1409, 1445–49 (6th Cir . 1991) .
58 . CAA § 109(b), 42 U .S .C . § 7409(b) (2006) .
59 . CWA § 303(c), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(c) (2006) .
60 . CAA §  109(b), 42 U .S .C . §  7409(b); CWA §  304(a)(2)(B), 33 U .S .C . 
§ 1314(a)(2)(B) (2006) .
61 . CAA § 160(1), 42 U .S .C . § 7470(1) (2006) (emphasis added) (stating that 
one purpose of the PSD program is to protect public health “from any actual or 
potential adverse effect which in [EPA’s] judgment may reasonably be anticipated 
to occur from air pollution  .  .  . notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of 
all national ambient air quality standards”) .
62 . Id .
63 . See David P . Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 
Calif . L . Rev . 48, 77 (1980) .
64 . Id .
protective .65 Accordingly, antidegradation requirements cre-
ate a safety net in the event existing ambient quality stan-
dards are inadequate .66
2.	 Protecting	Special	Natural	Resources
A second function of antidegradation constraints is to pro-
tect highly valued or vulnerable natural resources that may 
be at risk from exposure to pollutant concentrations that 
are established to protect public health . Both the CAA and 
CWA programs seek to promote that goal .67
One of the purposes of the CAA’s PSD program is to 
preserve, protect, and enhance air quality in national parks, 
wilderness areas, and other areas of “special” natural, rec-
reational, scenic, or historic value .68 Because adverse effects 
on natural resources may occur at concentrations lower than 
those that trigger health risks, the CAA’s welfare-based sec-
ondary standards may be more stringent than the health-
based primary standards .69 Even then, secondary standards 
may not be adequate to protect particularly vulnerable 
resources, or EPA may have underestimated how clean the 
air needs to be to protect those resources .
During congressional debate, supporters of the PSD 
program emphasized the benefits of protecting parks from 
air pollution, claiming that preservation of clean air would 
prevent damage that would occur even at pollution con-
centrations allowed by the national ambient air quality 
standards .70 Degradation of air quality in national parks 
would interfere with scenic vistas in places like the Grand 
Canyon and damage unique natural resources, frustrating 
the opportunities for preservation, recreation, and spiritual 
renewal that justified the creation of national parks and 
other protected areas .71 The CWA’s antidegradation policy 
serves the same function through its prohibition on water 
quality degradation in ONRWs .72 Enhanced protections 
are particularly critical if resource damage is expected to be 
65 . See Craig N . Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling 
Versus Site-Shifting, 74 Iowa L . Rev . 1, 64 (1988) [hereinafter Oren, Con-
trol-Compelling] . Supporters of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
(“PSD”) program also viewed the program as necessary because the national 
standards did not cover certain damaging pollutants such as sulfates that cause 
acid rain and failed to account for the synergistic effects of multiple pollutants . 
Id . at 60, 82 .
66 . Richard B . Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitution-
al Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons From The 
Clean Air Act, 62 Iowa L . Rev . 713, 742 n .144 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, 
Quasi-Constitutional Law] .
67 . CAA § 160, 42 U .S .C . § 7470 (2006); CWA § 101(c), 33 U .S .C . § 1251(c) 
(2006) .
68 . CAA § 160(2), 42 U .S .C . § 7470(2) . See generally Oren, Parklands, supra note 
56 .
69 . David Wooley & Elizabeth Morss, Clean Air Act Handbook, Appendix 
C (2011) . In practice, EPA rarely establishes separate secondary standards . See 
Glicksman et al ., supra note 3, at 406 .
70 . Oren, Parklands, supra note 56, at 329 .
71 . Id . at 315, 346–47 .
72 . See Glicksman et al ., supra note 3, at 616 .
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irreversible or to interfere with critical ecosystem functions 
or services .73
3.	 Preventing	the	Development	of	Pollution	
Havens
Without a nondegradation policy, areas with relatively clean 
air or water quality would have a greater capacity to assimi-
late pollution without violating applicable ambient standards 
than would more polluted areas .74 Under both the CAA and 
CWA, pollution control requirements tend to be most strin-
gent in highly polluted areas that are in violation of ambient 
quality standards . The CAA imposes rigorous controls on 
pollution sources in nonattainment areas,75 and the strin-
gency of the controls tends to increase in relation to the 
degree of noncompliance .76 Under the CWA, states whose 
waters are more polluted than state water quality standards 
allow must establish TMDLs that represent aggregate limi-
tations on discharges into those impaired waters .77 Absent 
nondegradation programs, new industrial sources with 
choices about where to locate (putting other factors aside) 
would tend to choose areas with less stringent pollution con-
trols to reduce costs of operation .78 The result would be not 
only degradation of existing good environmental quality, but 
also an exodus of business from industrialized areas to more 
remote, cleaner areas .
Antidegradation provisions can prevent “pollution 
havens” by removing incentives that would drive industry 
to clean areas if they were allowed to deteriorate to mini-
mal levels required by ambient standards . These provisions 
address a classic prisoner’s dilemma because states with high 
air or water quality would bear most of the costs of main-
taining it, while recouping only a small portion of the bene-
fits .79 “Each state, fearing undercutting by a state competing 
for economic development, would be reluctant to adopt a 
potentially disabling policy absent some assurance about 
what other states intended to do . All states would thus be 
paralyzed to act .”80 The CAA’s PSD program was designed to 
neutralize the attractiveness to industry of areas with supe-
73 . See, e.g., Robert W . Adler, Jessica C . Landman, & Diane M . Cameron, 
The Clean Water Act: 20 Years Later 200 (1993) (noting that headwater 
tributaries of larger watersheds can “provide clean base flow and critical spawn-
ing and rearing habitat to support downstream flows”) .
74 . See Hines, supra note 8, at 643 (discussing a strategy of “reducing pollution 
by spreading out discharge sources to take fuller advantage of the assimilative 
capacity of existing areas of high ambient air and water quality,” but reject-
ing such a strategy because “‘[d]ilution is not the solution to pollution”’) . Cf . 
Snyder, supra note 23, at 891 (“[A] water pollution control program may be 
very effective at pollution abatement in areas of poor water quality; yet if areas 
of high water quality become polluted at the same time, the program has only 
traded one problem for another .”) .
75 . See, e.g., CAA § 172(c), 42 U .S .C . § 7502(c) (2006) (listing requirements for 
state implementation plans that cover nonattainment areas) .
76 . See, e.g., id . § 7511a (2006) (requirements for ozone nonattainment areas) .
77 . CWA § 303(d), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(d) (2006) .
78 . See Snyder, supra note 23, at 891–92 .
79 . Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 66, at 747 .
80 . Hines, supra note 8, at 654 . See also Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra 
note 66, at 747 (noting the usefulness of antidegradation requirements in al-
leviating the “commons’ dilemma” by forcing states “to adopt policies which 
they would voluntarily select in the absence of transaction costs precluding 
common agreement”) .
rior air quality .81 The CWA’s antidegradation policy serves a 
similar function .82
4.	 Preventing	Interstate	Pollution
The CAA’s PSD program also sought to prevent activities 
in one state from harming other states by preventing areas 
from becoming “‘dumping grounds’ for the pollution caused 
by industrial sources in other regions .”83 The argument was 
apparently persuasive . One of the goals of the program is “to 
assure that emissions from any sources in any State will not 
interfere with any portion of the applicable implementation 
program to prevent significant deterioration of air quality for 
any other State .”84
A dispute between Arkansas and Oklahoma illustrates the 
potential for the CWA’s antidegradation policy to constrain 
interstate water pollution . The city of Fayetteville, Arkan-
sas, applied for a permit from EPA that would allow its new 
municipal wastewater treatment plant to discharge treated 
wastewater into a tributary of the Illinois River about forty 
miles upstream from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border .85 
Oklahoma protested, arguing that the discharge would 
impair a portion of the River it had designated as a Tier 3 
scenic river .86 EPA issued the permit anyway, finding that 
the discharge would not result in a violation of Oklahoma’s 
water quality standards .87 Responding to Oklahoma’s chal-
lenge to the permit, the Supreme Court agreed that both the 
CWA and EPA’s own regulations88 authorize EPA to ensure 
that a discharge does not violate downstream water quality 
standards .89 The Court, however, affirmed EPA’s finding that 
the treatment plant’s discharge would not cause an actual, 
detectable violation of the Oklahoma standards .90 Indeed, 
the Court concluded that it was not arbitrary for EPA to 
base issuance of the permit partly on the benefits to the river 
resulting from the increased flow of relatively clean water 
from the new plant .91 The Court’s decision endorsed EPA’s 
view that the CWA bars interstate pollution that causes 
81 . See Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 65, at 105, 111 (attributing the 
passage of the PSD program in 1977 to an effort by industrialized states to 
limit economic growth in the Sunbelt) . Distributional considerations may cut 
against the adoption of an antidegradation policy, too . According to Richard 
Stewart, a nondegradation policy “would inhibit economic development in 
areas with considerable poverty and unemployment, while the benefits would 
accrue in large measure to the wealthy who can afford to visit scenic areas of 
exceptionally high environmental quality or who are more likely to derive psy-
chic satisfaction from their preservation .” Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, 
supra note 66, at 750 .
82 . Cf . Bonnie A . Malloy, Testing Cooperative Federalism: Water Quality Standards 
Under the Clean Water Act, 6 Envtl . & Energy L . & Pol’y J . 63, 86 (2011) 
(noting that “lower standards would be more likely to attract industry”) .
83 . Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 65, at 85 .
84 . CAA § 160(4), 42 U .S .C . § 7470(4) (2006) .
85 . Arkansas v . Oklahoma, 503 U .S . 91, 95 (1992) .
86 . Id.
87 . Id . at 97 .
88 . 40 C .F .R . § 122 .4 (2011) . This section continues to preclude EPA from issuing 
a discharge permit “[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure com-
pliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States .”
89 . Arkansas, 503 U .S . at 105–07 . The Court found it unnecessary to decide 
whether the CWA requires EPA to protect water quality in a downstream state 
from an upstream discharge in another state . Id. at 104 .
90 . Id . at 111–12 .
91 . Id . at 114 .
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water quality standard violations, including violations of the 
antidegradation policy,92 but in practice the burden of link-
ing an upstream discharge with a downstream water quality 
violation may be difficult to meet .93
5.	 Balancing	Environmental	Goals	and	Economic	
Growth	Opportunities
Antidegradation programs seek to balance the protec-
tion of existing clean air and water quality and continued 
economic growth .94 A goal of the CAA’s PSD program 
is to “insure that economic growth will occur in a man-
ner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air 
resources .”95 Under the CWA’s policy, degradation of Tier 
2 waters is allowed if necessary to accommodate impor-
tant social and economic development .96 This approach 
avoids making existing air or water quality “an absolute 
minimum .”97 The result is “a flexible, site-specific consid-
eration of the economic justifications and social need for 
water quality degradation in light of available alternatives 
and the significance of the predicted degradation .”98
Antidegradation policies can be a vehicle for promoting 
efficient resource allocation . Degradation is allowed if the 
value of the economic development that causes it exceeds 
the resulting marginal decline in the value of the degraded 
resource .99 Antidegradation advocates have even couched 
these programs as job creators, which create opportunities 
for new sources by requiring tighter source controls and 
lower ambient concentrations in clean areas .100 As some sup-
porters of the CAA’s PSD program recognized,101 an anti-
degradation program also may serve as a temporary device 
to postpone exploitation of good environmental quality 
until the potential for economic growth justifies the result-
ing degradation .102
92 . Id . at 110 .
93 . For criticism of the standard of proof (i .e ., that an upstream source is caus-
ing an actual, detectable violation of another state’s water quality standards) 
endorsed by the Court, see Robert L . Glicksman, Watching the River Flow: The 
Prospects for Improved Interstate Water Pollution Control, 43 Wash . U . J . Urb . & 
Contemp . L . 119, 160–61 (1993) .
94 . Hines, supra note 8, at 650 .
95 . CAA § 160(3), 42 U .S .C . § 7470(3) (2006) .
96 . Kalisek, supra note 20, at 12 .
97 . Hines, supra note 8, at 645 .
98 . Mark C . Van Putten, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U . Mich . J .L . 
Reform 863, 899 (1986) . EPA’s failure to define important economic and 
social development has given states broad discretion to endorse degradation of 
Tier 2 waters, as long as existing uses are not prevented or state water quality 
standards otherwise violated . See Adler et al ., supra note 73, at 202 .
99 . Hines, supra note 8, at 645 .
100 . Oren, Control Compelling, supra note 65, at 97 .
101 . “Representative Waxman, for instance, urged that the program ought to be 
adopted as a means to control the growth of clean air areas so that there would 
be room for future industrial growth; this statement perhaps implies a desire to 
use PSD to keep some clean air for later appropriation .” Id . at 101 .
102 . Id. This argument for postponing exploitation “draws from the conservation-
ist, rather than the preservationist, roots of the environmental movement,” 
id. at 101–02, in that the former supported the management of natural re-
source use to maximize economic returns over time . See Hines, supra note 8, 
at 646 (noting that “the idea of nondegradation seems to be closely related to 
large principles of conservation”) . These conservation principles are similarly 
expressed in the sustained yield provisions of the federal public land manage-
ment statutes described in Part III .A, infra.
II. Historical Experience With the Clean 
Water Act’s Antidegradation Program
The success of antidegradation programs in preventing dete-
rioration of high-quality water bodies varies widely from state 
to state .103 Although the antidegradation policy is intended 
to protect high-quality waters, it is by no means a precise set 
of instructions to the states .104 EPA interprets its role in the 
enforcement of antidegradation policies as a passive one .105 
It may disapprove and promulgate all or part of an imple-
mentation process for antidegradation if, in the judgment of 
the Administrator, the state’s process (or certain provisions 
thereof) circumvents the intent and purpose of the federal 
antidegradation policy .106 EPA rarely does so, however .107 
EPA’s proclivity for leaving the policy vague, and for afford-
ing broad discretion to the states, has precluded the develop-
ment of a consistent national antidegradation policy .108 As 
a result, critics describe the policy as “at best, obscure,” and 
lacking in substantive content .109
This Part reviews the nation’s experiences with the des-
ignation of high-quality waters and with the subsequent 
implementation of protective measures for, and permitting 
decisions in, those waters . It begins by comparing variations 
in the states’ designation criteria and processes . It then cri-
tiques the states’ implementation of permitting authorities 
for designated waters, and highlights instances where state 
implementation has failed to ensure against the degradation 
of high-quality waters . It concludes with an in-depth assess-
ment of the antidegradation policy’s deficiencies .
A.	 State	Designation	Variations
The designation process for Tier 1 through 3 waters110 “var-
ies enormously” from state to state .111 EPA’s antidegradation 
policy does not provide adequate guidance on how to distin-
103 . See, e.g., TetraTech, Inc ., Evaluation of Options for Antidegradation 
Implementation Guidance 20 (2008), available at http://dec .alaska .gov/wa-
ter/wqsar/wqs/pdfs/Antidegradation_tetratech_final .pdf .
104 . Harleston, supra note 27, at, 52–53 (“In its almost thirty years of existence, few 
details of implementing antidegradation have been expressed .”) .
105 . Avinash Kar et al ., Natural Res . Def . Council, Effective Environ-
mental Compliance and Governance: Perspectives From the Natural 
Resources Defense Council 9 (2010), available at http://docs .nrdc .org/
international/files/int_10051901a .pdf .
106 . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, supra note 39, at § 4 .3 .
107 . See Kar et al ., supra note 105, at 7 (noting that EPA could serve as an im-
portant catalyst in defining minimum standards, but that it must work more 
closely with the states to ensure compliance with the laws) .
108 . Harleston, supra note 27, at 77 .
109 . Jeffrey M . Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean 
Water Act, 31 Harv . Envtl . L . Rev . 409, 454 (2007) [hereinafter Gaba, Gen-
eral Permits] . See also Robert W . Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: 
Lessons From the Clean Air Act, 23 Harv . Envtl . L . Rev . 203, 292 (1999) 
(“the current [CWA antidegradation] program  .  .  . is so vague as to defy clear 
explanation”) .
110 . See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text for a description of the three-
tiered structure of the CWA’s antidegradation program .
111 . Merritt Frey, River Network, Implementing the Clean Water Act 
in the Intermountain West: An Overview 45 (2009), available at http://
www .rivernetwork .org/cwwpolicyanalysis . See Adler, supra note 109, at 213 
(noting wide variations in designation criteria and processes) .
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guish between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters .112 Likewise, EPA’s 
definition of Tier 3 (Outstanding National Resource Waters) 
is unclear .113 Moreover, some states’ regulations provide no 
information whatsoever on how a water body might be nom-
inated or how a designation decision might be made, leaving 
protection of the highest quality waters at risk .114 “Designa-
tion policies in many states are so vague as to be hard for a 
concerned citizen or watershed group to use  .  .  . or even to 
understand how they could use them .”115 As a result, courts 
tend to defer to the agencies’ designation decisions, unless 
there is no evidence whatsoever to support them .116
Criteria and processes for distinguishing between Tier 1 
and Tier 2 waters are especially opaque . In Kentucky Water-
ways Alliance v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit addressed a series 
of challenges to Kentucky’s antidegradation policy .117 The 
court deferred to EPA’s view that its own regulations permit-
ted either a pollutant-by-pollutant or water body-by-water 
body approach to determining which waters merit Tier 2 
protection .118 It also allowed automatic exclusion of impaired 
waters from Tier 2,119 and found that a state’s program com-
plies with the antidegradation policy as long as all waters 
whose quality exceeds fishable/swimmable water quality are 
afforded Tier 2 protection .120 According to the court, neither 
the CWA nor EPA regulations require that a minimum per-
centage of a state’s waters be afforded Tier 2 protection .121
Occasionally, a state’s explanation for a designation is so 
inadequate that judicial relief is forthcoming . In West Vir-
ginia, for example, a district court invalidated EPA’s approval 
of the state’s antidegradation program for deficiencies in both 
designation and implementation .122 With regard to designa-
tion, the court rejected the state’s classification of segments 
of the Kanawha and Monongahela Rivers as Tier 1 waters .123 
The absence of evidence about the water quality of those riv-
ers failed to support denying them the more stringent protec-
tion of Tier 2 .124 The court also invalidated EPA’s approval 
112 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a) (2011); Gaba, General Permits, supra note 109, at 454 . 
See Gaba, New Growth, supra note 15, at 675 (“Unfortunately, the difference 
between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters may, in many cases, be more metaphysical 
than biological .”); Kalisek, supra note 20, at 11 (stating that the states have 
struggled with how to identify Tier 2 high-quality waters) .
113 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a)(3) . See John A . Chilson, Keeping Clean Waters Clean: 
Making the Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy Work, 32 U . Mich . J .L . 
Reform 545, 553–55 (1999) .
114 . Frey, supra note 111, at 51 . See, e.g., Am . Littoral Soc’y v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . 
Agency, 199 F . Supp . 2d 217, 238 (D .N .J . 2002) (rejecting challenge to state’s 
failure to designate any waters to be protected by antidegradation policy be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to identify any waters requiring protection) .
115 . Frey, supra note 111, at 50 .
116 . See, e.g., In re Town of Sherburne, 581 A .2d 274, 275 (1990) (upholding 
downgrading of waters to accommodate proposed sewage disposal facility) .
117 . Ky . Waterways Alliance v . Johnson, 540 F .3d 466, 472–73 (6th Cir . 2008) .
118 . Id. at 475–77 .
119 . Id . at 477–81 .
120 . Id . at 481 .
121 . Id.
122 . Ohio Valley Envtl . Coal . v . Horinko, 279 F . Supp . 2d 732, 737 (S .D . W . Va . 
2003) .
123 . Id.
124 . Id . The court ruled that EPA regulations permit classification of waters as Tier 
1 or Tier 2 based on a water body-by-water body approach, without having to 
make classifications for each pollutant . Id . at 747–48 . But the record contained 
no evidence to justify classifying the rivers as Tier 1, other than their appear-
ance on the list of impaired waters . Id . at 750 .
of a provision that failed to require Tier 2 protection in all 
cases where the water segment supported minimum fishable/
swimmable uses and had assimilative capacity remaining for 
some parameters .125
With respect to the most protective category—Tier 3 
ONRWs—some states have no regulations regarding pro-
cesses or criteria for making designation decisions .126 Perhaps 
not surprisingly, then, some states have no ONRWs within 
their boundaries .127 EPA regulations include, as examples of 
ONRWs, “waters of National and State parks and wildlife 
refuges and waters of exceptional recreational or ecological 
significance .”128 These waters are not covered, however, unless 
a state takes affirmative steps to designate them, and states 
sometimes refuse to do so because ONRWs are afforded the 
highest level of protection .129 Absent explicit state designa-
tions, courts have refused to recognize ONRWs at the behest 
of citizens’ groups .130
A few states do in fact use the ONRW designation to 
protect wilderness waters and critical habitat, in addition to 
parks, refuges, and other unique water bodies .131 Montana 
automatically designates all “surface waters located wholly 
within the boundaries of designated national parks or wil-
derness areas .”132 Florida’s ONRW program includes parks, 
refuges, wilderness areas, memorials, and waters of special 
recreational or ecological significance .133 Colorado includes 
water bodies that constitute “a significant attribute” of wil-
derness areas .134 Washington has imposed a higher burden 
of proving eligibility for Tier 3 status, requiring water bodies 
within wilderness areas to be “relatively pristine” or possess 
exceptional water quality to be eligible as ONRWs .135
125 . Id . at 766 .
126 . Frey, supra note 111, at 51 .
127 . Judith M . Brawer, Antidegradation Policy and Outstanding National Resource 
Waters in the Northern Rocky Mountain States, 20 Pub . Land & Resources L . 
Rev . 13, 21 (1999) . See also Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed . Reg . 
36742, 36786 (July 7, 1998) (characterizing the designation of ONRWs as 
limited, although some states have designated a high percentage of their waters 
as ONRWs) .
128 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a)(3) (2011) . See generally Michael C . Blumm & Thea 
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 
Ariz . L . Rev . 701, 716–20 (1995) (describing the implications of ONRW 
designation on diversions of water from tributaries to Mono Lake for use in 
Los Angeles) .
129 . Bryan Bird & Rachel King, WildEarth Guardians, Clean Waters, Wild 
Forests: A Citizen Manual for Designating Outstanding Waters in 
the Wild Forests of the Western United States 8 (2011) (states are given 
discretion as to the actual designation of ONRWs) .
130 . See, e.g., Save the Lake v . Schregardus, 752 N .E .2d 295, 303 (Ohio Ct . App . 
2001) (refusing to treat waters within a state park as automatically entitled to 
ONRW status) .
131 . See C . Mark Hersh, The Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy and Its Role 
in Watershed Protection in Washington State, 15 Hastings W .-Nw . J . Envtl . 
L . & Pol’y 217, 222–29 (2009) (advocating use of antidegradation policy as 
an underutilized habitat protection tool in Washington state); Brawer, supra 
note 127, at 20–27 (discussing designation of ONRWs in Montana, Idaho, 
and Wyoming) .
132 . Mont . Admin . R . § 17 .30 .617(1) (2006) .
133 . Fla . Admin . Code Ann . R . § 62-302 .700(2) (2006) .
134 . Colo . Code Regs . § 1002-31:31 .8(2)(a)(ii)(A) (2007) . See also Colo . Code 
Regs . § 1002-31:31 .28(C)(3) (explaining that ONRW designations apply in 
wilderness areas despite the fact the wilderness areas already have other types 
of protections in place; to conclude otherwise “would prevent application of 
the outstanding waters designation to waters that may be among those most 
deserving of protection”) .
135 . Wash . Admin . Code § 173-201A-330(1)(a) (2003) .
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New Mexico’s experience might serve as an example of 
how efforts to designate and protect ONRWs can work 
fairly well . In 2010, the New Mexico Water Quality Con-
trol Commission adopted an across-the-board rule designat-
ing all perennial surface waters in Forest Service wilderness 
areas as ONRWs .136 Prior to the rule, there were only two 
ONRWs in New Mexico—the Rio Santa Barbara in the 
Pecos Wilderness and the waters of the Valle Vidal in the 
Carson National Forest .137 The new designation covers 700 
miles of 195 perennial rivers and streams, 29 lakes, and 
1,405 wetlands in 12 wilderness areas .138 According to the 
New Mexico Environment Department, “[t]hese waters rep-
resent the State’s most valuable headwater streams . Protec-
tion of these headwaters will help maintain a clean water 
supply for uses in Wilderness and for downstream uses by 
municipalities, agriculture, and recreational interests, and 
will help maintain healthy ecosystems, preserve habitat, 
and protect vulnerable and endangered species .”139 To pro-
tect ONRWs, the new rule prohibits new or increased point 
source discharges that would adversely impact water qual-
ity and requires best management practices (“BMP”) for 
nonpoint sources .140 It provides that, except for pre-existing 
land-use activities that comply with BMPs, water quality 
cannot be degraded in ONRWs .141
Ironically, some of the newly designated ONRWs are on 
the section 303(d) “impaired waters” list .142 The ONRW des-
ignation may stimulate restoration efforts on these waters . 
According to a representative of the Coalition for the Valle 
Vidal, the Valle Vidal illustrates how some ONRWs receive 
a fair amount of attention for restoration work .143 A long his-
tory of grazing, mining, and logging left some of the Valle 
Vidal tributaries in a “highly degraded state .”144 Ongoing 
136 . Standards for Interstate and Intrastate Surface Waters, N .M . Water Qual-
ity Control Comm’n, 20 .6 .4 .9 .D(3) NMAC (2009); Standards for Inter-
state and Intrastate Surface Waters, N .M . Water Quality Control Comm’n, 
20 .6 .4 .8 .A(3)-(4) NMAC (2011); see Press Release, Office of the Sec’y, N .M . 
Env’t Dep’t, Water Quality Control Commission Adopts Petition that Protects 
Headwater Streams in Wilderness Areas of New Mexico (Dec . 1, 2010), avail-
able at http://www .nmenv .state .nm .us/OOTS/documents/PR-ONRWPasses-
Final-12-1-10 .pdf; Standards for Interstate and Intrastate Surface Waters, 
N .M . Water Quality Control Comm’n, 20 .6 .4 .9 .B, D NMAC (2011) (pro-
viding criteria for ONRW designation) . Two other states in the intermountain 
west—Utah and Wyoming—have designated all waters within large geograph-
ic areas such as national forests or wilderness areas as ONRWs . Frey, supra note 
111, at 50 .
137 . E-mail from Erik Schlenker-Goodrich, Interim Exec . Dir ., W . Envtl . Law Ctr ., 
to Sandra Zellmer (Jan . 19, 2012) (on file with authors) .
138 . Order and Statement of Reasons, N .M . Water Quality Control Comm’n, 
WQCC 10-01(R) 23 (Dec . 15, 2010), available at ftp://ftp .nmenv .state .
nm .us/www/HearingOfficer/ONRW/WQCCOrder+SOR20 .6 .4NMAC .pdf .
139 . Office of the Sec’y, supra note 136, at 2 .
140 . N .M . Water Quality Control Comm’n, Antidegradation Policy Imple-
mentation Procedure 17 (2010), available at ftp://ftp .nmenv .state .nm .us/
www/swqb/CPP/2010/CPP-AppendixA .pdf (point sources); N .M . Water 
Quality Control Comm’n, Guidance for Nonpoint Source Discharg-
es in Outstanding National Resource Waters G-1 (2009) [hereinafter 
Guidance for Nonpoint Source Discharges], available at ftp://ftp .nmenv .
state .nm .us/www/swqb/WPS/NPSPlan/2009NPSPlan-AppendixG11-30-10 .
pdf (nonpoint source discharges) .
141 . Guidance for Nonpoint Source Discharges, supra note 140, at G-4 .
142 . E-mail from Schlenker-Goodrich, supra note 137 .
143 . Id .
144 . Comanche Creek, http://www .comanchecreek .org/ (last visited Dec . 18, 
2012) .
restoration efforts include relatively inexpensive, yet effective, 
low-tech restoration projects like fencing, erosion control 
structures made of rock and vegetation, and road drainage 
devices that direct runoff into vegetative buffer zones .145
Environmental groups applauded the state’s efforts to 
protect ONRWs,146 but the New Mexico Cattle Growers 
Association petitioned to set aside the new rule147 and urged 
the Commission to designate smaller watersheds on a case-
by-case basis rather than in one blanket rule .148 The court 
ultimately dismissed the Cattlegrowers’ challenge on juris-
dictional grounds, leaving the ONRW designation intact, 
and the Commission is going forward with the implementa-
tion of the ONRW rule .149
B.	 State	Implementation	Variations
EPA regulations require that state water quality standards 
“identify the methods for implementing” the antidegrada-
tion policy .150 In some instances, litigants have leveled facial 
attacks on entire state programs or significant components of 
those programs; in others, they have identified more discrete 
actions, such as the issuance of permits, alleged to be in vio-
lation of the state’s antidegradation program .151 The judicial 
treatment of these challenges has been inconsistent, but one 
theme emerges: a state antidegradation program that is little 
more than an empty shell is vulnerable to attack . 
1.	 Programmatic	Attacks
In Kentucky Waterways Alliance, the Sixth Circuit took issue 
with Kentucky’s decision to exempt five categories of dis-
charges from the requirement that new or expanded dis-
charges into high-quality waters pass Tier 2 review .152 The 
plaintiffs argued that the exemptions “eviscerate[d] Ken-
145 . Restoration Practices, Comanche Creek, http://comanchecreek .org/Restora-
tion_Practices/index .html (last visited Dec . 18, 2012) . Restoration goals are 
“to meet current water quality standards; restore hydrologic function to the 
creek and it[s] tributaries; and maximize habitat for the Rio Grande cutthroat 
trout .” Comanche Creek, supra note 144 .
146 . Press Release, Susan Montoya Bryan, Associated Press, NM Regulators Ap-
prove Outstanding Waters, (Dec . 1 2010), available at ftp://ftp .nmenv .state .
nm .us/www/swqb/News/AP12-01-2010Article .pdf . See generally Overview of 
ONRW Protections and History in New Mexico, Amigos Bravos, http://ami-
gosbravos .org/onrw .php (last visited Dec . 18, 2012) .
147 . Brief for Appellant, N .M . Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v . Water Quality Control 
Comm’n, Ct . App . No . 31,191 (N .M . Ct . App . Aug . 22, 2011); see Staci 
Matlock, New Rule Under Fire From N.M. Cattle Growers Association, San-
ta Fe New Mexican (Jan . 10, 2011), http://www .santafenewmexican .com/
localnews/outstanding-waters-New-rule-under-fire-from-cattle-growers .
148 . See Brief for Appellant at 20, N. M. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, Ct . App . No . 31,191 .
149 . See N .M . Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v . N .M . Water Quality Comm’n, No . 31,191 
(N .M . Ct . App . Dec . 26, 2012) . See also Water Quality Standards: Outstand-
ing National Resource Waters, Surface Water Quality Bureau, N .M . Env’t 
Dep’t, http://www .nmenv .state .nm .us/swqb/ONRW/ (last updated Dec . 18, 
2012) .
150 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a) (2012) .
151 . See infra text accompanying notes 152–74 (programmatic challenges); infra 
text accompanying notes 175–203 (challenges to discrete actions) .
152 . Ky . Waterways Alliance v . Johnson, 540 F .3d 466, 491 (6th Cir . 2008) . The 
five categories included any expanded discharge under a renewed or modified 
state permit, so long as the expansion did not increase pollutant loading by 
twenty percent or more . Id .; see also supra text accompanying notes 117–21 
(describing court’s deference to EPA’s approval of Kentucky’s exclusion of cer-
tain waters from Tier 2 designation) .
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tucky’s Tier [2] review process, allowing significant degrada-
tions in water quality without demonstrated necessity .”153 The 
court reasoned that because EPA’s antidegradation regula-
tions protected assimilative capacity, EPA’s task was to focus 
on how much assimilative capacity would be lost under the 
exemptions, and, in particular, whether that loss would be 
significant or merely de minimis .154 Instead of assessing the 
exemptions’ cumulative effects, EPA measured Kentucky’s 
compliance by assessing whether each individual exemption 
resulted in “significant” or “insignificant” degradation of 
assimilative capacity .155 The court, therefore, lacked an ade-
quate factual record for determining whether the exemptions 
together permitted significant degradation, and it remanded 
to EPA for further analysis .156
Similarly, the West Virginia district court chastised 
EPA for ignoring the plain meaning of the state regula-
tions in approving provisions allowing new or expanded 
discharges from wastewater treatment plants to evade Tier 
2 review if the discharge resulted in a net decrease in the 
overall pollutant loading .157 According to the court, EPA’s 
approval in effect rewrote the provision to apply only when 
there is a net decrease in the pollutant loading for each 
pollutant parameter .158
EPA’s lack of vigilance in overseeing state compliance 
with the antidegradation policy was also reflected in its 
approval of an egregiously deficient implementation plan 
in Oregon .159 The plan contained only one sentence provid-
ing that the state’s entire set of water quality standards was 
“intended to implement the Antidegradation Policy .”160 The 
court held that EPA erred in approving a policy that failed 
to identify “even a semblance of an implementation plan,” in 
153 . Ky. Waterways Alliance, 540 F .3d at 492 .
154 . Id . “[A]ssimilative capacity is a measurement of the amount by which  .  .  . qual-
ity exceeds levels necessary to support fish, wildlife, and recreation .” Id. at 484 . 
According to EPA, “the central purpose of the federal Tier II antidegradation 
regulations is to protect a water body’s assimilative capacity, which is ‘the dif-
ference between the applicable water quality criterion for a pollutant parameter 
and the ambient water quality for that parameter when it is better than the 
criterion .’” Id. (citing Memorandum from Ephraim S . King, Dir ., Office of 
Sci . & Tech ., U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, to Water Mgmt . Div . Dirs . (Aug . 10, 
2005)); Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed . Reg . at 36793 .
155 . Ky. Waterways Alliance, 540 F .3d at 492 .
156 . Id . at 492–93 . Cf . Ohio Valley Envtl . Coal . v . Horinko, 279 F . Supp . 2d 732, 
770–73 (S .D . W . Va . 2003) (invalidating EPA’s approval of a provision deem-
ing degradation to be significant if the proposed activity, together with all other 
activities allowed after the baseline water quality is established, resulted in a 
reduction of a water segment’s available assimilative capacity of twenty per-
cent or more for parameters of concern because EPA failed to explain why a 
twenty percent reduction in assimilative capacity should be considered insig-
nificant); Rivers Unlimited, Inc . v . Schregardus, 685 N .E .2d 603 (Ohio C .P . 
1997) (holding that state law allowing agency to approve lowering of stream’s 
water quality by as much as eighty percent of its assimilative capacity without 
antidegradation review was inconsistent with the CWA) .
157 . Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 279 F . Supp . 2d at 737–38, 752–57 . See supra note 
124 (describing court’s invalidation of Tier 1 designations) .
158 . Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 279 F . Supp . 2d at 737–38, 752–57 . The court up-
held EPA’s approval of other aspects of the program . It held that EPA properly 
approved the state’s partial exemption of existing permitted uses from Tier 2 
review, a provision allowing for a de minimis ten percent reduction in the 
available assimilative capacity of Tier 2 waters before Tier 2 review is required, 
and provisions allowing water quality trades without triggering antidegrada-
tion review . Id . at 751–52, 767–70, 774–76 .
159 . See Nw . Envtl . Advocates v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 268 F . Supp . 2d 1255 
(D . Or . 2003) .
160 . Id. at 1264–65 (quoting Or . Admin . R . 340–041–0026(1)(a) (2012)) .
clear violation of its own regulation .161 Subsequently, when 
EPA approved Oregon’s revised implementation plan, its 
decision was remanded once again because the plan failed 
to specify a method to identify and protect existing uses .162 
The court rejected EPA’s argument that the CWA does not 
specify a minimum method for implementing antidegrada-
tion policies but simply requires that states “identify meth-
ods for their implementation .”163 It concluded that EPA must 
review the state’s entire implementation plan to ensure that 
it describes all of the required elements and does not cir-
cumvent the purpose of the antidegradation policy .164 On 
the other hand, the court deferred to EPA’s determination 
that a provision that applied to “recognized beneficial uses” 
protected all “existing uses” from becoming “unacceptably 
threatened or impaired .”165 It also upheld EPA’s interpreta-
tion of Oregon’s use of the term “unacceptably” as allow-
ing only de minimis threats or impairments to existing uses, 
but noted that “Oregon’s program must, at a minimum, not 
allow activities that could partially or completely eliminate 
any existing uses .”166
Some of the most significant programmatic challenges 
have involved nonpoint source pollution . Judicial reactions 
to these challenges have been mixed . When Montana’s 
legislature “attempted to undermine the effectiveness of 
the ONRW designation by exempting activities identified 
as ‘nonsignificant’ from antidegradation review,”167 EPA 
directed the state to revise its program to protect the water 
quality of ONRWs from “even non-significant, permanent 
changes in water quality .”168 EPA approved Montana’s sub-
sequent proposal, which extended the antidegradation pro-
gram to all point sources, but continued to exempt nonpoint 
sources (and mixing zones) from its requirements .169 In par-
ticular, Montana’s new provision exempted nonpoint sources 
from the antidegradation requirements for Tier 2 waters 
“when reasonable land, soil, and water conservation prac-
tices [were] applied and existing and anticipated beneficial 
uses [would] be fully protected .”170 In American Wildlands v. 
Browner, the Tenth Circuit deferred to EPA’s approval based 
161 . Id . at 1265 (citing 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a) (2011)) . See also CORALations v . 
U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 477 F . Supp . 2d 413, 418 (D .P .R . 2007) (overturn-
ing EPA’s approval of water quality standards that lacked any methods or pro-
cedures to apply Puerto Rico’s antidegradation policy to wetlands) .
162 . Nw . Envtl . Advocates v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, No . 3:05–cv–01876–AC, 
2012 WL 653757 (D . Or . Feb . 28, 2012) .
163 . Id. at *19 .
164 . Id. EPA argued that, although states are required to identify methods for im-
plementing their antidegradation policy, those methods need not be contained 
in the state’s regulation .
165 . Id. at *18 (citing PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty., 511 U .S . at 705) . EPA inter-
preted this provision as disallowing “both unacceptable threats to uses and 
actual use impairment .” Id.
166 . Id . at *17–18 .
167 . Brawer, supra note 127, at 23 (citing Mont . Code Ann . § 75-5-317 (1997)) .
168 . Id. at 23–24, citing Region VIII EPA letter to Gov . Marc Racicot 3–5 (Dec . 
1998)) . 
169 . American Wildlands v . Browner (American Wildlands I), 94 F . Supp . 2d 1150, 
1150 (D . Colo . 2000), aff’d, 260 F .3d 1192 (10th Cir . 2001) .
170 . American Wildlands v . Browner (American Wildlands II), 260 F .3d 1192, 1195 
(10th Cir . 2001) (citing Mont . Code Ann . § 75-5-317(2)(b)) . This exemp-
tion did not apply to ONRWs . See American Wildlands I, 94 F . Supp . at 1159 
n .5.
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on its belief that “the Act nowhere gives the EPA the author-
ity to regulate nonpoint source discharges .”171
Conversely, in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA, 
the court was unmoved by EPA’s assertion that it lacked 
authority to “review and potentially disapprove Oregon’s 
nonpoint source provisions as a part of its water quality stan-
dards review .”172 The court declined to follow American Wild-
lands, explaining that because “many temperature impaired 
waters in Oregon are impaired in whole or in part by non-
point sources of pollution, the challenged provisions could 
present a considerable obstacle to the attainment of water 
quality standards when, by law, the sources of pollution are 
deemed to be in compliance with water quality standards .”173 
The court noted that one function of water quality standards 
is to achieve federally-approved water quality goals through 
both state controls and “federal strategies other than point-
source technology-based limitations,” and that “[t]his pur-
pose pertains to waters impaired by both point and nonpoint 
sources of pollution .”174
2.	 As	Applied	Challenges	to	Tier	1	and	2	Waters	
Issues
Other judicial challenges have focused on more discrete 
aspects of state antidegradation provisions applicable to one 
or more of the three tiers of waters . In some of these “as 
applied” cases, judicial interpretation has watered down 
antidegradation requirements, such as in a pair of North 
Dakota cases involving the approval of permits allowing 
phosphorous discharges into high-quality waters because of 
the purported economic and social importance of the dis-
charging activities .175
171 . American Wildlands II, 260 F .3d at 1198 . See also Defenders of Wildlife v . U .S . 
Envtl . Prot . Agency, 415 F .3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir . 2005) (“the CWA does 
not require states to take regulatory action to limit the amount of nonpoint 
water pollution introduced into its waterways”) . But cf. Montana Envtl . Info . 
Ctr . v . Dep’t of Envtl . Quality, 988 P .2d 1236 (Mont . 1999) (finding that a 
state statute exempting a gold mine’s discharges of arsenic-laced water into 
rivers that provided habitat for endangered species from the antidegradation 
review process violated the state’s constitutional provision guaranteeing its citi-
zens a right to a clean and healthy environment) .
172 . Northwest Envtl . Advocates v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, No . 3:05–cv–01876–
AC, 2012 WL 653757, at *17–18 (D . Or . Feb . 28, 2012) . Plaintiffs challenged 
several regulations that essentially exempted various nonpoint sources of heat 
pollution from complying with water quality standards from antidegradation 
review “so long as they do not increase in frequency, intensity, duration, or 
geographical extent .” Id. at *11 .
173 . Id. at *13 .
174 . Id. at *17 (citing Pronsolino v . Nastri, 291 F .3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir . 2002)) . 
Pronsolino paved the way for this decision by finding that EPA’s TMDL regula-
tions “focused on the attainment of water quality standards regardless of the 
source of the pollution .” Id. at *9 (emphasis added) . Disputes have also arisen 
over the applicability of state antidegradation programs to other types of activi-
ties . See, e.g., W . Va . Coal Ass’n v . Reilly, 728 F . Supp . 2d 1276 (S .D . W . Va . 
1989), aff’d, 932 F .3d 964 (Table), 33 Env’t Rep . Cas . (BNA) No . 1353 (4th 
Cir . 1991) (upholding EPA’s authority to object to state’s issuance of permit to 
coal mining operation that would involve use of streams for waste assimilation 
and treatment, in violation of the antidegradation policy) .
175 . See People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc . v . N .D . Dep’t of Health, 697 
N .W .2d 319, 330–31(N .D . 2005) (upholding outlet permit for discharge into 
category 1 lake because the addition of phosphorus would not alter the ben-
eficial use of waters, the agency adequately considered other, less degrading 
alternatives, and the agency determined that the outlet was part of a project 
designed to accommodate social and economic factors in the affected regions); 
An Alabama court’s rejection of an environmental 
group’s attack on a state antidegradation regulation high-
lights the difficulties of challenging findings that economic 
necessity justifies degradation .176 The court upheld a regu-
lation allowing a permit applicant to meet its obligation 
to provide “alternatives” to discharges into Tier 2 waters 
simply by showing that the project’s costs did not exceed a 
threshold for annualized costs .177 The court characterized 
the rule as “a compromise between environmental and 
broader economic concerns [that] the judiciary should be 
loath to disturb .”178 The court reasoned that the state per-
mitting agency needed the discretion to decide whether, 
at some level, the needs of the state’s people would be bet-
ter served by placing upper limits on the costs of indus-
trial plants than by “requiring massive and inefficient 
expenditures in order to achieve marginal improvements 
in water quality .”179
In a few cases, the antidegradation policy has constrained 
the issuance of discharge permits .180 Most commonly, courts 
have rejected permits for discharges into Tier 2 waters 
because of the absence of any findings of necessary economic 
or social development .181 Permitting decisions that blatantly 
ignore the need to justify degradation of Tier 2 waters, then, 
are likely to be more vulnerable than decisions purporting to 
rest on a finding of necessity .
The courts have also served as a check on agency efforts 
to exempt projects from antidegradation protections . In 
one case, for example, a Montana agency declined to apply 
the state’s antidegradation policy to discharges from a mine 
adit based on a regulation exempting “nonsignificant” 
discharges into Tier 2 waters .182 Had the policy applied, 
the discharges would have been subject to significantly 
more stringent controls, and the process for reviewing 
the mine’s permit application would have entailed more 
People to Save Sheyenne River, Inc . v . N .D . Dep’t of Health, 744 N .W .2d 
748 (N .D . 2008) (upholding modification of permit for lake outlet because 
it would not cause concentration of any parameter of concern to increase by 
more than fifteen percent); see also Community Ass’n for Restoration of the 
Env’t v . Wash . Dep’t of Ecology, 205 P .3d 950 (Wash . Ct . App . 2009) (uphold-
ing general permit for confined animal feeding operations that required soil 
but not groundwater monitoring) .
176 . Ala . Dep’t of Envtl . Mgmt . v . Legal Envtl . Assistance Found ., 922 So . 2d 101 
(Ala . Civ . App . 2005) .
177 . Id. at 108 .
178 . Id . at 114 .
179 . Id . at 113 .
180 . See, e.g., Hughey v . Gwinnett Cnty ., 609 S .E .2d 324 (Ga . 2004) (invalidating 
issuance of a permit to a wastewater treatment plant because, even though the 
administrative law judge appropriately found the requisite necessity, the permit 
failed to meet the state antidegradation policy’s requirement that the county 
use the best practicable treatment technology) .
181 . See, e.g., Ill . EPA v . Ill . Pollution Control Bd ., 896 N .E . 2d 479 (Ill . App . Ct . 
2008) (finding that the permitting agency’s record lacked data showing that the 
increased discharge was unavoidable or necessary, did not discuss other feasible 
alternatives that might have negated the necessity of the increased discharge, 
and did not contain information regarding the possibility of other methods to 
eliminate or reduce phosphorus and/or nitrogen before discharging wastewater 
into stream); see also Columbus & Franklin Cnty . Metro . Park Dist . v . Shank, 
600 N .E .2d 1042, 1057–59 (Ohio 1992) (concluding that a state agency acted 
arbitrarily in deciding that degradation of water quality in a creek was “neces-
sary to accommodate important economic or social development”) .
182 . Clark Fork Coal . v . Mont . Dep’t of Envtl . Qual., 197 P .3d 482, 493 (Mont . 
2008) .
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public scrutiny .183 The Montana Supreme Court held that 
the agency’s unsupported statement that a perpetual dis-
charge from the adit would always be sufficiently treated 
did not justify its determination that the discharge would 
be “nonsignificant .”184
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the state agency’s 
identification of two parameters for the purpose of making 
“nonsignificance” determinations, triggering the application 
of antidegradation review to the discharge of coalbed meth-
ane produced waters .185 A federal district court, however, 
subsequently remanded EPA’s approval of Montana’s rules 
adopting numerical standards for the two parameters because 
EPA failed to consider industry’s concerns about the alleged 
lack of scientific support for the standards .186 In critiquing 
EPA’s explanation that the two parameters “may” be harm-
ful, the court spuriously concluded, without any supporting 
rationale or citations, that “[a]pproving a state standard on 
the basis that a parameter may be harmful is certainly not 
what the Clean Water Act envisioned .”187 The court failed to 
recognize that the CWA reflects Congress’s intent to protect 
water quality against threats of uncertain magnitude, requir-
ing, for example, that total maximum daily loads include “a 
margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowl-
edge concerning the relationship between effluent limita-
tions and water quality .”188
These cases indicate that, once a properly adopted state 
antidegradation program is in place, states have consider-
able discretion to accommodate discharges into Tier 1 and 2 
waters to promote economic and social goals, provided they 
comply with regulatory procedures and supply some eviden-
tiary support for their substantive determinations .
3.	 As	Applied	Challenges	to	Tier	3	Waters	Issues
Courts have been somewhat less deferential in reviewing 
permitting decisions that impact Tier 3 waters (ONRWs), 
at least when it comes to new or expanded uses with clear 
impacts on water quality .189 In League to Save Lake Tahoe 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the court held that the 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency arbitrarily allowed addi-
tional mooring buoys, piers, and other forms of development 
in its shoreline ordinances .190 The ordinances would have 
allowed increased motor boating, which in turn would cause 
increased pollutant discharges and runoff into Lake Tahoe, 
183 . Id . at 489 .
184 . Id . at 493 . See also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v . Mont . Dep’t of Envtl . Quality, 
234 P .3d 51, 58 (Mont . 2010) (invalidating permits to coalbed methane pro-
duction operation that authorized discharge into high-quality waters of mil-
lions of pounds of sodium each year, even though high salinity levels already 
had impaired the river) .
185 . Pennaco Energy, Inc . v . Mont . Bd . of Envtl . Review, 199 P .3d 191, 199 (Mont . 
2008) .
186 . Pennaco Energy, Inc . v . U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 692 F . Supp . 2d 1297 (D . 
Wyo . 2009) .
187 . Id . at 1314 .
188 . CWA § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2006) .
189 . See League to Save Lake Tahoe v . Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 739 F . Supp . 
2d 1260, 1268 (E .D . Cal . 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 
and remanded, 469 F . App’x . 621 (9th Cir . 2012) .
190 . Id . at 1266, 1268 .
which California had classified as an ONRW .191 Although 
the Agency proposed mitigation measures, including “no 
wake” zones, speed limits, and user fees, the court found that 
its determination that there would be no significant water 
quality impacts was arbitrary .192
Along the same lines, a Minnesota court set aside a per-
mit allowing a city to triple the capacity of a wastewater 
treatment plant and discharge nearly two million gallons 
of waste each day into an ONRW river .193 The state’s anti-
degradation rules prohibited any new or expanded dis-
charges into an ONRW unless there was no prudent and 
feasible alternative, and then only “to the extent neces-
sary to preserve the existing high quality” of the receiving 
water .194 The court held that the state permitting agency 
failed to provide substantial evidence that the alternative 
of downsizing the treatment plant and using decentralized 
treatment was not feasible .195 The court also held that the 
permitting agency erroneously restricted the discharge only 
to prevent degradation below ordinary water quality stan-
dards rather than to protect the existing high quality of the 
water .196 Finally, by failing to define the baseline existing 
quality of the water, the permitting agency could not evalu-
ate whether the proposed discharge would preserve existing 
high quality .197
In a subsequent case, however, the Minnesota court 
rejected a challenge to a permit alleged to be in violation 
of Minnesota’s antidegradation rules .198 An environmental 
group claimed that the state agency failed to consider the 
impact of the introduction of new invasive species through 
ballast water discharges into Lake Superior .199 The court 
deferred to the agency’s technical expertise that discharges 
need only be restricted “to the extent necessary to preserve 
the existing high [water] quality .”200 Although analysis of the 
impact of new invasive species on the lake’s quality might 
have been prudent, the agency’s failure to address the risks 
associated with species that had already or might in the future 
arrive as a result of ballast water discharges was not arbitrary 
where the Lake had been “receiving ballast-water pollutants 
without restriction for as long as commercial vessels have 
operated on Lake Superior .”201 Similarly, in Port of Seattle v. 
191 . Id. at 1291–92 .
192 . Id. at 1268 .
193 . Minn . Ctr . for Envtl . Advocacy v . C’mmr of Minn . Pollution Control Agency, 
696 N .W .2d 95, 108 (Minn . Ct . App . 2005) .
194 . Id . at 101 .
195 . Id . at 105 . Cf . Minn . Ctr . for Envtl . Advocacy v . Minn . Pollution Control 
Agency, 660 N .W .2d 427 (Minn . Ct . App . 2003) (invalidating general per-
mit for stormwater discharges as violation of antidegradation rules because the 
state agency failed to consider whether discharges were expanded) .
196 . Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy, 696 N .W .2d at 107 .
197 . Id . at 108 .
198 . In re Request for Issuance of the SDS General Permit MNG300000 for Ballast 
Water Discharges, 769 N .W .2d 312, 315 (Minn . Ct . App . 2009) .
199 . Id.
200 . Id . at 321 .
201 . Id . at 322 . See, e.g., In re La . Dep’t of Envtl, Quality Permitting Decision: Tim-
berBranch II Sewage Treatment Plan, No . 2010 CA 1236, 2011 WL 1225985 
(La . App . 1 Cir . 2011) (affirming agency’s decision that discharges of treated 
sewage would not degrade water quality in ONRW tributary); In re Freshwater 
Wetlands Prot . Act Rules, 180 N .J . 415 (2004) (affirming New Jersey’s au-
thorization of cranberry growing operations in the ONRWs of the Pinelands 
National Reserves) .
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PCHB, a Washington court affirmed the agency’s conclusion 
that an airport runway project would satisfy the state’s anti-
degradation policy despite potential impacts to stream flows 
in class AA waters, the equivalent of ONRWs .202 It seemed 
to take comfort in the fact that under the state’s policy, the 
developer must offset the impacts of the project, even though 
it need not restore the AA waters to pristine condition .203
C.	 Antidegradation	Policy	Deficiencies
The cases described above demonstrate that the CWA’s 
antidegradation policy is neither fulfilling its potential for 
identifying and protecting high-quality waters, nor meet-
ing the five goals delineated above in Part I . These deficien-
cies fall into several categories: (1) failure to ensure that 
high-quality waters receive proper designation; (2) failure 
to define “degradation” and to identify appropriate triggers 
for preventing it in the face of “important” economic con-
siderations; and (3) failure to regulate all significant sources 
of degradation . A fourth defect—the failure to detect inad-
equate antidegradation plans and follow through with 
appropriate enforcement—is revealed by on-the-ground 
implementation issues arising outside of the litigation con-
text . This part explores each of these deficiencies, while 
Part IV sets forth proposed reforms .
1.	 Designation	Inconsistencies
EPA’s antidegradation policy does not provide adequate 
guidance on how to distinguish Tier 1 from Tier 2 waters .204 
EPA allows states to take either a pollutant-by-pollutant or 
water body-by-water body approach, with few substantive 
parameters . Likewise, EPA’s definition of Tier 3 is illustrative 
rather than prescriptive, and its approach to state-by-state 
designation is wholly discretionary .205 Accordingly, some 
state regulations provide no procedural or substantive speci-
fications whatsoever for designation decisions, leaving many 
high-quality waters unprotected beyond the lowest common 
denominator—Tier 1 .
2.	 What	Is	“Degradation”	and	When	Is	It	
Allowed?
In addition to the designation vagaries described above, one 
key question is how to define “degradation .” EPA’s regula-
tions utterly fail to recognize the relevance of that question .206 
EPA apparently allows states to limit Tier 2 protections to 
activities that result in “significant” degradation of water 
quality, invoking an inherent authority to avoid regulating 
de minimis environmental threats .207 State definitions of the 
202 . Port of Seattle v . Pollution Control Hearings Bd ., 90 P .3d 659, 681 (Wash . 
2004) .
203 . Id.
204 . See supra note 112 and accompanying text .
205 . See supra note 113 and accompanying text .
206 . Harleston, supra note 27, at 57 .
207 . Gaba, New Growth, supra note 15, at 677 . See Ohio Valley Envtl . Coal . v . 
Horinko, 279 F . Supp .2d 732, 767–68 (S .D . W . Va . 2003); see also Kent 
point at which impairment triggers antidegradation review 
are inconsistent .208 Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
in Kentucky Waterways Alliance indicates,209 the antidegrada-
tion policy fails to protect against the cumulative effects of 
multiple discharges that impair existing water quality .210
A related flaw is the failure to describe just how “necessary” 
and “important” economic or social development must be to 
allow degradation of Tier 2 high-quality waters .211 Accord-
ing to EPA, the phrase seeks to convey “a general concept 
regarding what level of social and economic development 
could be used to justify a change in high-quality waters . Any 
more exact meaning will evolve thorough case-by-case appli-
cation  .  .  .”212 The burden of demonstrating economic impor-
tance is supposed to “be very high .”213 State regulations differ 
markedly in how they apply this requirement, however .214 
Absent constraints, the exception threatens to swallow the 
antidegradation rule .215
3.	 What	Pollution	Sources	Are	Regulated?
In addition to the inconsistencies in defining “degradation” 
and “important” development, troublesome gaps have devel-
oped through the exclusion of certain pollution sources . 
In the intermountain west, for example, “the region’s anti-
degradation policies are riddled with exemptions . The most 
common exemption is for existing sources—all eight states 
‘grandfather’ existing sources if they are not expanding 
their discharges .”216 Only a few states in the region—Ari-
zona, Wyoming, and New Mexico—appear to meet EPA’s 
requirement that new and expanded discharges in tribu-
taries of ONRWs be limited to those that will not degrade 
water quality .217 Exceptions for nonpoint sources—existing 
or new—are equally widespread . Although a few states—
Modesitt, Antidegradation: A Lost Cause or the Next Cause?, 2 U . Denv . Water 
L . Rev . 189, 217 (1999) (noting that an EPA regional office supported the use 
of a significance determination) .
208 . See Modesitt, supra note 207, at 217 (noting that state approaches vary); Frey, 
supra note 111, at 44 (finding that five of the eight intermountain states “ap-
ply some sort of numeric, percent-based measure of ‘insignificant’ degradation 
(often called de minimis degradation) that is allowable without review”) .
209 . Ky . Waterways Alliance v . Johnson, 540 F .3d 466, 485 (6th Cir . 2008) .
210 . See Adler, supra note 109, at 285 .
211 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a) (2011) .
212 . Questions & Answers, supra note 26, at 8 .
213 . Kalisek, supra note 20, at 12 (quoting U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, supra note 
39, at § 4 .5) .
214 . Frey, supra note 111, at 39–41; Adler et al ., supra note 73, at 202; Katherine 
Zogas, The Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy: Has It Been “Dumped”?, 42 
J . Marshall L . Rev . 209, 229–30 (2008); Gaba, New Growth, supra note 15, 
at 686 .
215 . Stitts, supra note 19, at 1359 . But cf. Ala . Dep’t of Envtl . Mgmt . v . Legal Envtl . 
Assistance Found ., 922 So . 2d 114–15 (Ala . Civ . App . 2005) (rejecting claim 
that portion of state program requiring showing of necessity for important eco-
nomic and social development for new or expanded discharges to Tier 2 waters 
was void for vagueness) . Cf. Pac . Topsoils, Inc . v . Wash . Dep’t of Ecology, 238 
P .3d 1201, 1210 (Wash . Ct . App . 2010) (rejecting contention that state anti-
degradation program was unconstitutionally vague as applied to placement of 
fill material into wetlands without a permit) .
216 . Frey, supra note 111, at 44 .
217 . Id. at 52–53 .
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like New Mexico,218 Washington,219 and Florida220—apply 
antidegradation provisions to all sources of pollution in 
ONRWs—including nonpoint sources—many, if not most, 
states appear to have no restrictions on nonpoint source dis-
charges whatsoever .221 As noted above, Montana’s exemption 
for nonpoint sources has been upheld,222 leaving high-quality 
waters in rural areas unprotected from the most significant 
sources of water pollution .223
4.	 Lack	of	Follow	Up
Beyond the lessons learned from several decades of anti-
degradation litigation, it appears that some of the problems 
associated with the implementation of the policy stem from 
EPA’s failure to follow up after a state adopts an antidegrada-
tion program . As evidenced by the Government Account-
ability Office’s (“GAO”) assessment of the Great Lakes 
Initiative (“GLI”), the lack of follow through turns in part 
on EPA’s failure to issue a consistent permitting strategy for 
the states .224 The GLI amendment to the CWA required that 
the eight Great Lakes states—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin—include provisions consistent with EPA’s GLI guidance 
in their regulations and permit programs .225 But according 
to the GAO, the states’ permitting structures are not consis-
tent with each other or with any overarching comprehensive 
strategy . Moreover, EPA’s attempts to assess the effectiveness 
of the states’ antidegradation policies have been hindered by 
inadequate data .226 Even for priority pollutants, like dioxin 
218 . See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text .
219 . Wash . Admin . Code § 173-201A-300(2)(e)(i), (iii) (2003); Hersh, supra note 
131, at 232 .
220 . In Florida, “no degradation” of ONRWs and “Outstanding Florida Waters” 
is allowed, “notwithstanding any other Department rules that allow water 
quality lowering .” See Fla . Admin . Code Ann . R . § 62-302 .700(1) (2006) . 
See Christie C . Morgan, Challenges and Opportunities in Protecting Outstand-
ing National Resource Waters, 5-SPG Nat . Resources & Env’t 30, 33 (1991) 
(citing Fla . Admin . Code Ann . R . § 17-4 .242(3)(b) (1989)) . Interestingly, 
the Florida legislature specifically prohibited horticultural peat mining—a key 
economic driver in the state—in Outstanding Florida Waters . Fla . Stat . Ann . 
§ 373 .414(6)(e)(2)(d) (West 2006) .
221 . See, e.g., Frey, supra note 111, at 54, tbl . 22 (listing Arizona, Colorado, Mon-
tana, and Nevada as lacking explicit nonpoint source controls); id. at 53 (“The 
manner in which the states have addressed nonpoint source pollution control 
varies dramatically in the [intermountain] region .”) .
222 . See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text . See also Douglas R . Williams, 
When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response 
to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 Wash . U . J .L . & Pol’y 21, 40 
(2002) (“For [some] states, increases in nonpoint source pollution that impair 
existing uses would not be considered to violate state water quality standards 
or the antidegradation policy, so long as designated uses are fully supported .”) .
223 . Blumm & Warnock, supra note 20, at 108–09 .
224 . See U .S . Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-82, Great Lakes Ini-
tiative: EPA Needs to Better Ensure the Complete and Consistent 
Implementation of Water Quality Standards 28–29 (2005) [hereinafter 
Great Lakes Initiative], available at http://www .gao .gov/assets/250/247244 .
pdf . The 1990 amendments to the CWA require EPA to publish guidance for 
the Great Lakes states on minimum standards, implementation procedures, 
and antidegradation policies for protecting water quality .
225 . See Great Lakes Critical Programs Act of 1990 § 1, Pub . L . No . 101-596, 104 
Stat . 3000, 3000 (1990) .
226 . See Great Lakes Initiative, supra note 224, at intro . (“Attempts by EPA to as-
sess GLI’s impact have been limited because of inadequate data or information 
that has not been gathered for determining progress on dischargers’ efforts to 
reduce pollutants .”) .
and other bioaccumulative chemicals, sufficiently sensitive 
measurements have not been developed .227
The GAO concluded that the GLI has limited potential to 
protect water quality for two primary reasons: (1) it focuses 
primarily on point sources and (2) it condones flexible imple-
mentation procedures, like variances, that relieve discharg-
ers from stringent water quality standards .228 Indeed, “the 
GLI allows the repeated use of some of these flexibilities and 
does not set a time frame for facilities to meet the GLI water 
quality criteria .”229 Moreover, the inability to reliably mea-
sure pollutant concentrations hinders the implementation of 
antidegradation policies .230 The GAO’s report advised EPA 
to issue permitting strategies that provide for a more con-
sistent approach among the states and to gather and track 
information that can be used to assess the progress of imple-
menting the antidegradation policy and its impact on reduc-
ing pollutant discharges and improving water quality .231
If the well-funded, well-coordinated GLI has made 
so little progress, it should be no surprise that antideg-
radation policies in other regions are lagging behind as 
well .232 As the River Network concluded in its report on 
the intermountain west, “[t]he power of antidegradation 
is vastly underdeveloped .”233
III. A Comparison of Antidegradation 
Programs and Public Land Management 
Protection Regimes
Most federal public land management statutes include some 
sort of antidegradation provision, ranging from outright 
prohibitions against impairment of the land and its natu-
227 . “Of the nine [bioaccumulative chemicals of concern] [(“BCC”)] for which 
criteria have been established, only two—mercury and lindane—have EPA-
approved methods that will measure below those criteria levels .” U .S . Gov’t 
Accountability Office, GAO-08-312T, Statement of David Maurer, 
EPA and States Have Made Progress, But Much Remains to Be Done 
if Water Quality Goals Are to Be Achieved 2 (2008) [hereinafter EPA 
and States Have Made Progress], available at http://www .gao .gov/as-
sets/120/118778 .pdf .
228 . See Great Lakes Initiative, supra note 224, at 3 .
229 . EPA and States Have Made Progress, supra note 227, at 3 .
230 . See Great Lakes Initiative, supra note 224, at 12, 20 . “For example, because 
chlordane has a water quality criterion of 0 .25 nanograms per liter but can 
only be measured down to a level of 14 nanograms per liter, it cannot always be 
determined if the pollutant is exceeding the criterion .” EPA and States Have 
Made Progress, supra note 227, at 3 .
231 . See Great Lakes Initiative, supra note 224, at 35–36 . A follow-up audit in 
2005 concluded that accurate analytical methods and measurements are still 
lacking, and that the use of variances, mixing zones, and other “permit flex-
ibilities” continues to hinder progress toward meeting the criteria . EPA and 
States Have Made Progress, supra note 227, at 4, 7 . For a summary of EPA’s 
response to the GAO’s critique, see id. at 9 .
232 . Congress appropriated $475 million for Great Lakes restoration in the 
2010 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub . Law . No . 111-88 . See Robert 
Esworthy, Cong . Res . Serv ., R41149, EPA Appropriations for FY 
2011, at 25–26, available at http://www .nationalaglawcenter .org/assets/
crs/R41149 .pdf . For analysis of the status of the nation’s waters more gen-
erally, see The H . John Heinz III Ctr . for Sci ., Econ . & the Env’t, 
The State of the Nation’s Ecosystems 2008 (2008), available at http://
www .heinzcenter .org/Ecosystems_files/The%20State%20of%20the%20 
Nation%27s%20Ecosystems%202008 .pdf (reporting on the continued deg-
radation of U .S . water bodies and sediments by chemical contaminants and 
nutrients, especially from nonpoint sources) .
233 . Frey, supra note 111, at 39 .
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ral resources to more lenient provisions aimed at protecting 
certain priority resources from destruction by incompatible 
uses . This part considers an array of preservation-oriented 
statutes governing wilderness areas, National Parks, Wildlife 
Refuges, and Wild and Scenic Rivers, as well as a key conser-
vation-oriented statute that provides for sustained yields on 
lands managed by the National Forest Service . These statutes 
may apply directly to waters covered by the existing CWA 
antidegradation policy, especially Tier 3 ONRWs, many of 
which run through wilderness areas, parks, refuges, or other 
protected areas . Even when the land management statutes do 
not themselves apply to waters covered by the antidegrada-
tion policy, they may serve as models for strengthening the 
protections of the aquatic environments that are, or should 
be, covered by the CWA’s antidegradation policy .
A.	 A	Hierarchy	of	Protective	Standards
1.	 The	National	Wilderness	System
The Wilderness Act of 1964 is the nation’s preeminent pres-
ervation statute .234 Today, federally designated wilderness 
areas are found within National Forests, National Parks, 
Wildlife Refuges, and lands managed by the Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM”) .235 There are nearly seven hundred 
wilderness areas in forty-four states, covering 109 million 
acres of land .236
The fundamental purpose of the Wilderness Act is to 
secure the present and future benefits of untrammeled wild 
lands for the public .237 To accomplish this goal, the Act spec-
ifies that wilderness areas shall be managed “in such manner 
as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment 
as wilderness, and so as to provide for  .  .  . the preservation of 
their wilderness character .  .  .  .”238 It also directs the manag-
ing agencies to protect and manage wilderness areas “so as to 
preserve natural conditions .”239
In 1977, not long after the advent of the CWA’s antideg-
radation policy, Dean William Hines called antidegradation 
“the pollution control analogue to wilderness protection in 
234 . See Sandra Zellmer, Wilderness, Water, and Climate Change, 42 Envtl . L . 313, 
316 (2012); William Rodgers, The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environ-
mental Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 Loy . L .A . L . Rev . 1009 (2004) .
235 . Land Purchase Under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act (FLTFA), 
Bureau of Land Mgmt . (“BLM”), U .S . Dep’t of Interior, http://www .blm .
gov/ca/st/en/prog/lands/fltfa/land_acquisition .html (last updated Oct . 21, 
2011) .
236 . See Russ W . Gorte, Cong . Research Serv ., RL31477, Wilderness: Over-
view and Statistics 4 (2008) . Excluding Alaska, wilderness areas comprise 
only three percent of the United States . Id.
237 . See Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Mean-
ing, 45 Or . L . Rev . 288, 309 (1966) .
238 . 16 U .S .C . §  1131(a) (2006) . For descriptions of “wilderness character,” see 
Jerry F . Franklin & Gregory H . Aplet, Wilderness Ecosystems, in Wilderness 
Management: Stewardship and Protection of Resources and Values 
269–70 (John C . Hendee & Chad P . Dawson eds ., 2002) [hereinafter Wilder-
ness Management]; David N . Cole, Ecological Impacts of Wilderness Recreation 
and Their Management, in Wilderness Management, supra, at 414–16 (dis-
cussing the balance of objectives between protecting wilderness ecosystems and 
the quality of the visitor’s experience) .
239 . 16 U .S .C . § 1131(c) .
public lands management .”240 In implementation, however, 
the Wilderness Act has proven far more protective than the 
CWA’s antidegradation policy .
To accomplish its preservation-oriented purposes, the 
Wilderness Act prohibits activities that would impair or 
otherwise detract from the wildness of wilderness areas .241 
Permanent roads as well as commercial activities are strictly 
forbidden .242 With some exceptions, the Act also precludes 
motor vehicles, motorized equipment, mechanical transport, 
aircraft landings, structures, and installations .243 One of 
these exceptions, found in section 4(c), allows such activi-
ties and facilities if they are “necessary to meet minimum 
requirements for the administration of the area  .  .  . (includ-
ing measures required in emergencies involving the health 
and safety of persons within the area) .”244
Courts have construed this exception narrowly .245 In a 
case involving the Kofa Wilderness in Arizona, the Ninth 
Circuit enjoined the construction and maintenance of tanks 
to augment water supplies for bighorn sheep .246 The court 
found that, although wildlife conservation was undoubtedly 
a legitimate management objective, the tanks were installa-
tions that unlawfully trammeled the wilderness .247 Although 
such installations might be useful to sheep threatened by 
drought and high temperatures, the U .S . Fish and Wild-
life Service (“FWS”) had failed to establish that they were 
a necessary minimum requirement for wilderness adminis-
tration .248 The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion 
in Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, where it rejected the Park 
Service’s claim that transporting tourists in a passenger van 
across a wilderness area to provide access to historical struc-
tures was “necessary” just because it made access more con-
240 . Hines, supra note 8, at 645 . Hines added: “Because air and water are to an ex-
tent renewable resources, their degradation may not involve all of the problems 
of irreversibility that are raised in the destruction of other natural environ-
ments . Therefore, it might be expected that the policy would be applied most 
stringently when the threatened air and water resources either themselves are 
subject to irreversible damage or are inextricably related to other natural sys-
tems subject to such harm .” Id . at 652–53 .
241 . 16 U .S .C . § 1131(b) . See Californians for Alts . to Toxics v . U .S . Fish & Wild-
life Serv ., 814 F . Supp . 2d 992, 1014–17 (E .D . Cal . 2011) (agencies that 
manage wilderness are “responsible for preserving   .   .   . wilderness character”; 
“the Act is intended to enshrine the long-term preservation of wilderness areas 
as the ultimate goal”) (citing Wilderness Watch, Inc . v . U .S . Fish & Wildlife 
Serv ., 629 F .3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir . 2010)) . The principal author of the Wil-
derness Act, Howard Zahniser, viewed the term “wild” as synonymous with 
“untrammeled”: “not subject to human controls and manipulations that ham-
per the free play of natural forces .” Zellmer, supra note 234, at 10 .
242 . 16 U .S .C . §  1133(c) (2006) . See Wilderness Soc’y v . U .S . Fish & Wildlife 
Serv ., 353 F .3d 1051, 1061–63 (9th Cir . 2003), as amended on reh’g en banc in 
part, 360 F .3d 1374 (9th Cir . 2004) (enjoining commercial salmon enhance-
ment project); Barnes v . Babbitt, 329 F . Supp . 2d 1141, 1154 (D . Ariz . 2004) 
(invalidating a plan that allowed repairs and maintenance of access routes as 
unlawful road construction) .
243 . 16 U .S .C . § 1133(c).
244 . Id .
245 . See Peter A . Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 Stan . Envtl . L .J . 62, 82 
(2010) [hereinafter Appel, Wilderness and the Courts]; Peter A . Appel, Wil-
derness, the Courts, and the Effect of Politics on Judicial Decisionmaking, 35 
Harv . Envtl . L . Rev . 275, 293–94 (2011) (finding that courts are more 
likely to uphold wilderness-protective decisions than they are wilderness-
impacting decisions) .
246 . Wilderness Watch, Inc., 629 F .3d at 1024 .
247 . Id. at 1033–34 .
248 . Id. (citing 16 U .S .C . § 1133(c) (2006)) .
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venient and had “no net increase” in impacts to the land .249 
Likewise, in Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, a federal district court disagreed 
with the Forest Service that the application of rotenone was 
necessary to promote the recovery of the Paiute Cutthroat 
Trout and to preserve wilderness character .250 The agency 
improperly neglected the well-being of other endemic spe-
cies in the wilderness .251
The second exception for otherwise non-conforming activ-
ities in wilderness areas, section 4(d), authorizes “such mea-
sures  .  .  . as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects, 
and diseases .”252 The only published opinions directly on 
point involve the Forest Service’s efforts to control the south-
ern pine beetle .253 In the first of two related cases, the court 
remanded a proposal for extensive chemical spraying and 
logging as “wholly antithetical to the wilderness policy estab-
lished by Congress,” and “hardly consonant with preserva-
tion and protection of these areas in their natural state .”254 
The court explained that “[o]nly a clear necessity for upsetting 
the equilibrium of the ecology could justify this highly inju-
rious, semi-experimental venture of limited effectiveness .”255 
In the second case, the court upheld a pared down version 
of the proposal that used “spot control” logging to combat 
infestations .256 It approved measures that “fall short of full 
effectiveness” so long as they are “reasonably designed” to 
limit infestation .257 The court was careful to note, however, 
that the agency had significantly scaled back its plan and had 
adopted several preservation-oriented safeguards .258
The Wilderness Act has been a significant factor in pre-
venting the degradation of federally designated wilder-
ness areas .259 Of course, there is room for criticism . Some 
commentators argue that “managers have extensively 
manipulated wilderness to achieve desired ends .”260 But the 
Wilderness Act provides sufficiently detailed standards to 
hold officials accountable .261 Those standards afford greater 
249 . Wilderness Watch v . Mainella, 375 F .3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cir . 2004) .
250 . Californians for Alts . to Toxics v . U .S . Fish & Wildlife Serv ., 814 F . Supp . 2d 
992, 1019 (E .D . Cal . 2011) . Rotenone is a powerful poison that kills every-
thing with gills .
251 . Id. However, where the agency makes extensive factual findings that otherwise 
incompatible activities, such as motorized access, are necessary to preserve wil-
derness character, for example, by aiding “the restoration of a specific aspect of 
the wilderness character  .  .  . that had earlier been destroyed by man,” its deci-
sion may be upheld . Wolf Recovery Found . v . U .S . Forest Serv ., 692 F . Supp . 
2d 1264, 1268 (D . Idaho 2010) .
252 . 16 U .S .C . § 1133(d)(1) (2006) .
253 . Sierra Club v . Lyng (Lyng I), 662 F . Supp . 40 (D .D .C . 1987); Sierra Club v . 
Lyng (Lyng II), 663 F . Supp . 556 (D .D .C . 1987) .
254 . Lyng I, 662 F . Supp . at 43 .
255 . Id. (emphasis added) .
256 . Lyng II, 663 F . Supp . at 556 .
257 . Id. at 560 .
258 . Id. at 557–59 . The Forest Service assured the court that the activities would not 
“unnecessarily sacrifice[ ]” wilderness values and were not aimed at promot-
ing commercial timber harvest . Id. at 560 . The court found that the primary 
purpose of the agency’s previous plan for a large-scale eradication program was 
commercial in nature . Lyng I, 662 F . Supp . at 40 .
259 . See Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, supra note 245, at 129 .
260 . Gordon Steinhoff, Interpreting the Wilderness Act of 1964, 17 Mo . Envtl . L . 
& Pol’y . Rev . 492, 501 (2010); see also Gordon Steinhoff, The Wilderness Act, 
Prohibited Uses, and Exceptions: How Much Manipulation of Wilderness Is Too 
Much?, 51 Nat . Resources J . 287, 294 (2011) .
261 . See Appel, Wilderness in the Courts, supra note 245, at 66–67 .
discretion to err on the side of overprotection of wilderness 
than underprotection . Based on an empirical analysis of 
wilderness litigation in the federal courts, Professor Peter 
Appel found that agencies are far more successful in defend-
ing against claims that they protected wilderness too strin-
gently than that they provided inadequate protection .262 
Appel described this phenomenon “as a one-way judicial 
ratchet in favor of wilderness protection .”263
Although the Wilderness Act is not a complete analogue 
to the CWA, given its distinctive preservation-oriented edict 
for lands that are owned solely by the federal government, 
it can provide a few important lessons for improving the 
antidegradation program . The explicit statutory prohibi-
tion against impairment with only a few narrowly crafted 
statutory exceptions, coupled with the directive to preserve 
wilderness character and natural conditions, gives agencies, 
courts, and citizens substantial powers to prevent degrada-
tion .264 In addition, courts’ willingness to require “a clear 
necessity,” not just convenience, to invoke exceptions to the 
Act’s preservation provisions could serve as a useful guide-
post for implementation of the necessity determination for 
degradation of Tier 2 waters .265
2.	 The	National	Parks
One of the earliest expressions of an antidegradation require-
ment in federal law is found in the National Park Service 
Organic Act of 1916 (“Organic Act”) .266 The Organic Act 
requires the Park Service to manage the national parks “to 
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects 
and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of 
the same in such manner  .  .  . as will leave them unimpaired 
for the enjoyment of future generations .”267 Thus, in mak-
ing decisions, the Park Service must “examine the duration, 
severity, and magnitude of the impact; the resources and val-
ues affected; and direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of 
262 . Id.
263 . Id . at 67 .
264 . See, e.g., Lyng I, 662 F . Supp . at 43 .
265 . See supra note 249 (describing Wilderness Watch v . Mainella, 375 F .3d 1085 
(11th Cir . 2004)); Lyng I, 662 F . Supp . at 42 (emphasis added) .
266 . 16 U .S .C . § 1 (2006) .
267 . Id. A 1978 amendment to the Organic Act forbids the Park Service from exer-
cising its protection and management responsibilities “in derogation of the val-
ues and purposes” of the parks . Redwood Act of 1978, § 101(b), Pub . L . No . 
95-250, 92 Stat . 163, 166 (codified as amended at 16 U .S .C . § 1a-1 (2006)) . 
The Park Service construes the “no derogation” standard as synonymous with 
the non-impairment standard of the 1916 Organic Act, Nat’l Park Serv ., Man-
agement Policies 2006 §  1 .4 .2 (2006) [hereinafter Management Policies 
2006], available at http://www .nps .gov/policy/mp2006 .pdf, and courts have 
generally concurred . See, e.g., Sierra Club N . Star Chapter v . LaHood, 693 
F . Supp . 2d 958, 965, 983 (D . Minn . 2010); S . Utah Wilderness Alliance v . 
Nat’l Park Serv ., 387 F . Supp . 2d 1178, 1192 (D . Utah 2005); United States 
v . Garfield Cnty ., 122 F . Supp . 2d 1201, 1244, 1249 (D . Utah 2000); see also 
Sierra Club v . Mainella, 459 F . Supp . 2d 76, 97–103 (D .D .C . 2006) (holding 
that decisions granting applications for exemptions from directional drilling 
regulations were arbitrary and capricious because the Park Service failed to 
explain its conclusion that impacts from nearby surface drilling activities, such 
as air pollution, noise, light, water pollution, fire, or spills, would not impair 
park resources and values), appeal dismissed per stipulation, Nos . 06-5419, 07-
5004, 2007 WL 1125716 (D .C . Cir . Mar . 30, 2007) .
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the action .”268 If impairment would result, “the action must 
not be approved .”269
Over the years, the National Park System has been wildly 
popular with the American public, and it has grown to 
include 397 national parks located in 49 states and several 
U .S . territories .270 But the dual mandate of the Organic 
Act—to conserve park resources from impairment and also 
to provide for the enjoyment of them—poses a significant 
challenge for the Park Service, and it has not always pre-
vented degradation of park resources .271 As Professor Rob-
ert Keiter has explained, the national parks are vulnerable 
to outside development pressures that have the potential to 
adversely affect wildlife, air and water quality, and surround-
ing landscapes .272
Although the National Park System is not perfect in 
terms of antidegradation, the Organic Act’s non-impair-
ment requirement, coupled with its overarching conserva-
tion mandate, places substantive parameters on the Park 
Service’s discretion that minimize degradation and promote 
long-term conservation of resources .273 The Park Service 
states that its conservation mandate, which extends to the 
ecological, biological, and physical processes that sustain the 
parks and their natural resources, “applies all the time, with 
respect to all park resources and values, even when there is 
no risk that any park resources or values may be impaired .”274 
Where uncertainties arise, the conservation concept acts as a 
precautionary principle of sorts . The Park Service recognizes 
that the “threshold at which impairment occurs is not always 
readily apparent,”275 so it has committed itself to “apply a 
standard that offers greater assurance that impairment will 
not occur  .  .  . by avoiding impacts that it determines to be 
unacceptable .”276 It defines “unacceptable impacts” as those 
that would individually or cumulatively conflict with a 
park’s purposes or values, interfere with uses of a park’s natu-
268 . Lower St . Croix National Scenic Riverway, 66 Fed . Reg . 56848, at 56850 
(Nov . 13, 2001) .
269 . Management Policies 2006, supra note 267, at § 1 .4 .7; see Terbush v . United 
States, 516 F .3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir . 2008) (“‘Whether an individual action 
is or is not an ‘impairment’ is a management determination . In reaching it, the 
manager should consider such factors as the spatial and temporal extent of the 
impacts, the resources being impacted and their ability to adjust those impacts, 
the relation of the impacted resources to other park resources, and the cumula-
tive as well as the individual effects .’”) (quoting Nat’l Park Serv ., 1988 Man-
agement Policies (1988))) . In Terbush, the court rejected most of the tort 
claims brought by the family of a deceased mountain climber under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, which shields federal agencies from liability for discretionary 
activities . 28 U .S .C . § 2680(a) (2006); Terbush, 516 U .S . at 1128–29 . It con-
cluded that the Park Service had “considerable” discretion under its Manage-
ment Policies, including the non-impairment standard, grounded in the Act’s 
“broad mandate to balance conservation with access and safety .” Terbush, 516 
U .S . at 1131–32 .
270 . About Us, Nat’l Park Serv ., http://www .nps .gov/aboutus/index .htm (last up-
dated Dec . 4, 2012) .
271 . Robert Keiter, The National Park System: Visions For Tomorrow, 50 Nat . Re-
sources J . 71, 72–73 (2010) .
272 . Id .
273 . 16 U .S .C . § 1 (2006) .
274 . Management Policies 2006, supra note 267, at §§ 1 .4 .3, 1 .4 .6 . However, the 
Park Service asserts management discretion “to allow impacts to park resources 
and values when necessary and appropriate to fulfill the purposes of a park, so 
long as the impact does not constitute impairment of the affected resources 
and values .” Id.
275 . Id. § 1 .4 .7 .1 .
276 . Id.
ral and cultural resources, diminish enjoyment by current or 
future generations, or unreasonably interfere with the peace, 
tranquility, or natural soundscape of wilderness and other 
protected locations within the park .277
The courts have generally agreed that “when there is a con-
flict between conserving resources and values and providing 
for enjoyment of them, conservation is to be predominant .”278 
They tend to uphold the Park Service’s decisions to restrict 
access and usage to ensure against impairment of resources 
and thereby promote conservation .279 In one case, a court 
even found an affirmative duty to assert federal reserved 
water rights for a unit of the National Park System—a can-
yon—that required instream flows to maintain its ecological 
integrity .280 Thus, the Park Service’s relatively stringent defi-
nitions of conservation, “impairment,” and “unacceptable 
impacts” could serve as useful guideposts in defining “anti-
degradation” of high-quality waters in the CWA context .
3.	 Wild	and	Scenic	Rivers
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (“WSRA”) of 1968 cre-
ates a nationwide network of wild, scenic, and recreational 
rivers .281 There are over two hundred rivers, encompassing 
thousands of miles, in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System .282
In the WSRA, Congress declared a policy to preserve 
the free-flowing characteristics and water quality of des-
ignated rivers .283 To be included, rivers must be free-flow-
ing and must also have “outstandingly remarkable” values 
(“ORV”) .284 Upon designation, rivers are classified as wild, 
scenic, or recreational . Wild rivers must be free of impound-
ments, “with watersheds or shorelines essentially primitive 
277 . Id.
278 . Fund for Animals v . Norton, 294 F . Supp . 2d 92, 96–97, 101, 103 (D .D .C . 
2003) (quoting Nat’l Park Serv ., 2001 Management Policies §  1 .4 .3 
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that adoption of final 
rule allowing 950 snowmobiles to enter Yellowstone and Grand Teton Na-
tional Parks each day was arbitrary and capricious), motion for relief from judg-
ment granted, 323 F . Supp . 2d 7 (D .D .C . 2004), motion to amend denied, 326 
F . Supp . 2d 124 (D .D .C . 2004), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No . 03-5365, 
2005 WL 375622 (D .C . Cir . Feb . 16, 2005) .
279 . See Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v . Babbitt, 82 F .3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir . 
1996); Mich . United Conservation Clubs v . Lujan, 949 F .2d 202, 207 (6th 
Cir . 1991); Organized Fishermen of Fla . v . Watt, 590 F . Supp . 805, 812–14 
(S .D . Fla . 1984), aff’d sub nom. Organized Fishermen of Fla . v . Hodel, 775 
F .2d 1544 (11th Cir . 1985); see also Keiter, supra note 271, at 87 (“When 
confronted with challenges to these recreational limitations, federal courts have 
consistently endorsed the Park Service’s ‘resource protection-first’ interpreta-
tion of its legal responsibilities .”) . But see Denise Antolini, National Park Law 
in the U.S.: Conservation, Conflict, and Centennial Values, 33 Wm . & Mary 
Envtl . L . & Pol’y Rev . 851, 891–96 (2009) (citing Davis v . Latschar, 202 
F .3d 349 (D .C . Cir . 2000) (upholding a decision to conduct a controlled deer 
hunt in Gettysburg National Military Park)); River Runners for Wilderness v . 
Martin, No . 06-894, 2007 WL 4200677 (D . Ariz . 2007) (upholding a plan 
to provide extensive access to commercial boaters on the Colorado River in 
the Grand Canyon); Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs . Ass’n v . Norton, 340 F . Supp . 2d 
1249 (D . Wyo . 2004) (remanding a decision to restrict snowmobiling)) .
280 . High Country Citizens’ Alliance v . Norton, 448 F . Supp . 2d 1235, 1242, 
1246–53 (D . Colo . 2006) .
281 . 16 U .S .C . § 1273(a) (2006); see Brian E . Gray, No Holier Temples: Protecting 
the National Parks Through Wild and Scenic River Designation, 58 U . Colo . L . 
Rev . 551, 552 (1988) .
282 . National Wild & Scenic Rivers, U .S . Nat’l Wild & Scenic Rivers, http://
www .rivers .gov/ (2012) .
283 . 16 U .S .C . § 1271 (2006) .
284 . Id . §§ 1273(b), 1271 .
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and waters unpolluted .”285 Scenic and recreational rivers are 
also generally free of impoundments, but they may have 
some development along their shorelines .286
Wild river segments, which like wilderness areas are 
“essentially primitive,” are highly protected .287 Rivers 
classified as recreational or scenic are governed by more 
lenient standards .288 Regardless of classification, dams are 
prohibited,289 and designated rivers must be administered in 
a manner to “protect and enhance” their ORVs .290 Moreover, 
no federal department or agency may undertake or assist in 
any “water resources project” that would have a “direct and 
adverse effect” on a river’s ORVs,291 and deleterious projects 
may be enjoined .292
In a series of Oregon cases decided in the late 1990s, 
courts found that the BLM’s management of grazing prac-
tices violated the WSRA .293 In Oregon Natural Desert Associ-
ation v. Green, the court remanded the BLM’s management 
plan for failure to consider whether grazing would “protect 
and enhance” vegetative ORVs .294 Grazing was subsequently 
enjoined when the BLM’s plan showed the negative impacts 
of grazing on scenic and recreational values .295
Although the Oregon cases indicate a willingness to engage 
in probing judicial review of activities with undeniably det-
rimental effects on ORVs, courts have been inconsistent in 
reviewing challenges to the Comprehensive Management 
Plans (“CMP”) for designated river segments .296 In Friends of 
285 . Id . § 1273(b)(1) . Like wilderness areas, wild rivers “represent vestiges of primi-
tive America .” Id.
286 . Id. § 1273(b)(2)-(b)(3) (2006) . See Sierra Club v . Pena, 1 F . Supp . 2d 971, 971 
n . 6 (D . Minn . 1998); see also Sierra Club N . Star Chapter v . LaHood, 693 F . 
Supp . 2d 958, 964 (D . Minn . 2010) .
287 . 16 U .S .C . § 1273(b)(1) (2006); see Wilderness Watch v . U .S . Forest Serv ., 143 
F . Supp . 2d 1186, 1205 (D . Mont . 2000) (stating that hunting and fishing 
lodges not allowed on wild river segments that should “represent vestiges of 
primitive America”); see also Or . Natural Desert Ass’n v . Singleton, 75 F . Supp . 
2d 1139, 1139 (D . Or . 1999) (permanently enjoining grazing in the wild river 
corridor); but see Riverhawks v . Zepeda, 228 F . Supp . 2d 1173, 1183 (D . Or . 
2002) (finding that recreational activities may interfere with aspects of a wild 
river, but deferring to the agency’s balance of values that allowed motorboats 
continued access to the river) .
288 . 16 U .S .C . § 1273(b)(2)-(3) (2006); see Friends of Yosemite Valley v . Norton, 
348 F .3d 789, 803–04 (9th Cir . 2003) (remanding the management plan for 
the Merced River for failure to protect and enhance the river’s geological, bio-
logical, and cultural ORVs and for failing to address impacts of visitor use); see 
also Sierra Club v . United States, 23 F . Supp . 2d 1132, 1140 (N .D Cal . 1998) 
(refusing to enjoin the Park Service from re-building a lodge and re-routing 
a road near scenic and recreational segments of the Merced River, and find-
ing that the project would not impinge on ORVs but instead would improve 
accessibility and environmental conditions by moving buildings further from 
the river) .
289 . 16 U .S .C . § 1278(a) (2006); see Swanson Mining Corp . v . FERC, 790 F .2d 96, 
102–05 (D .C . Cir . 1986) (Wild and Scenic Rivers Act prevents FERC from li-
censing hydroelectric projects on designated rivers even if FERC believes there 
would be no adverse effects to ORVs) .
290 . 16 U .S .C . § 1281(a) (2006) .
291 . Id . §  1278(b) . Such projects include water diversions, transmission lines, 
bridges, piers, levees, and boat ramps . See 36 C .F .R . § 297 .3 (2011); Pena, 1 
F . Supp . 2d at 979 (concluding that a bridge that would result in changes to a 
river’s free-flowing characteristics was a “water resources project”) .
292 . Pena, 1 F . Supp . 2d at 981 .
293 . Or . Natural Desert Ass’n v . Green, 953 F . Supp . 1133 (D . Or . 1997); Or . 
Natural Desert Ass’n v . Singleton, 75 F . Supp . 2d 1139 (D . Or . 1999) .
294 . Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Green, 953 F . Supp . at 1144 .
295 . Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Singleton, 75 F . Supp . 2d at1141 .
296 . See 16 U .S .C . §  1274(d)(1) (2006) (requiring comprehensive management 
plans (“CMP”) within three years of designation) .
Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, the court found that the lack 
of a comprehensive CMP warranted enjoining nine redevel-
opment projects in a designated river corridor .297 Conversely, 
in Center for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel, the court dis-
missed a complaint for lack of standing where the plaintiffs 
failed to show a causal link between the authorization of 
detrimental logging activities and the absence of a CMP .298 
According to the court, there was “no evidence” that CMPs 
“typically provide for greater restrictions” than other types of 
federal land management plans .299
Like the CWA’s antidegradation program, WSRA plan-
ning and management restrictions seem to be underutilized 
tools .300 As litigants have found, broad-brush challenges to a 
management agency’s discretion to balance competing uses 
typically fail, but challenges that identify discrete, harm-
ful activities that violate specific obligations to “protect and 
enhance” specific ORVs in a particular river segment may 
gain more traction .301
4.	 National	Wildlife	Refuges
The statutory directive to conserve the resources of the 
national wildlife refuges is analogous to the CWA’s mandate 
that high-quality waters be protected from degradation . The 
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 
(“NWRSIA”) defines the mission of the Wildlife Refuge 
System as the “conservation, management, and where appro-
priate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources 
and their habitats  .  .  . for the benefit of present and future 
generations of Americans .”302 Thus, conservation is the first 
priority for wildlife refuges .303 The Act defines conservation 
to include not only maintenance of existing refuge resources, 
but also, where appropriate, restoration and enhancement of 
healthy fish, wildlife, and plant populations .304 It directs the 
297 . Friends of Yosemite Valley v . Kempthorne, 520 F .3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir . 
2008); see also Sierra Club v . Babbitt, 69 F . Supp . 2d 1202, 1252 (E .D . Cal . 
1999) (“[W]here  .  .  . an agency has egregiously violated a procedural planning 
requirement which is closely linked to the ability of the agency to adequately 
assess the impacts of future plans and actions on the river’s ORVs, that pro-
cedural violation lends great weight to assertions that the substantive require-
ment to preserve and enhance the values for which river was included in the 
wild and scenic river system has been violated .”) .
298 . Ctr . for Biological Diversity v . Lueckel, 417 F .3d 532, 534 (6th Cir . 2005); 
see also In re Montana Wilderness Assn ., 807 F . Supp . 2d 990, 1000 (D . 
Mont . 2011) (rejecting the argument that a plan’s purported failure to address 
motorized uses and user capacities violated the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
(“WSRA”) when the BLM had balanced competing values of solitude and 
recreation by imposing road closures and seasonal restrictions while reaffirming 
long-standing uses) .
299 . Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 417 F .3d at 540 . The court found no evidence that 
a CMP would provide greater protection than the existing forest plan, which 
stated that designated river corridors “will be managed to protect and enhance 
the values for which the river was designated .”
300 . See Murray Feldman et al ., Learning to Manage Our Wild and Scenic River 
System, 20 Nat . Res . & Env’t 10, 70 (2005) (although the WSRA “provides 
a unique blend of conservation, development, and use for its river segment 
components  .  .  . the managing agencies  .  .  . are finding it difficult to give pri-
ority to wild and scenic rivers in these times of reduced budgets for resource 
management activities”) .
301 . Id .
302 . 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(a)(2) (2006) .
303 . 3 George Cameron Coggins & Robert L . Glicksman, Public Natural 
Resources Law § 24:5 (2nd ed . 2007) (citing 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(a)(4)(D)) .
304 . 16 U .S .C . § 668ee(4) (2006) .
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FWS to conserve fish, wildlife, plants, and their habitats, and 
to ensure maintenance of biological integrity, diversity, and 
environmental health within the Wildlife Refuge System .305
According to Professor Robert Fischman, the NWRSIA’s 
substantive management criteria provide “relatively rich 
detail  .  .  . compared to previous federal organic statutes .”306 
To achieve the Wildlife Refuge System’s conservation goals, 
the Act allows only “compatible uses” that “will not materi-
ally interfere with or detract from the fulfillment of” the 
System’s mission or individual refuge purposes .307 FWS 
regulations preclude any new use or expansion, renewal, or 
extension of an existing use unless it is deemed a compat-
ible use .308 The FWS must either terminate the incompatible 
use or modify it to make it compatible .309 Economic uses 
of refuge resources—livestock grazing, mineral develop-
ment, and other uses conducted for a profit—must satisfy 
an additional requirement:310 such uses must contribute to 
the achievement of the refuge purposes or the Wildlife Ref-
uge System mission .311
Under the FWS regulations, compatibility determina-
tions are typically made as part of the comprehensive con-
servation plan (“CCP”) for each refuge,312 but compatibility 
may be reevaluated at any time,313 such as when changed 
305 . Id . § 668dd(a)(4) . An executive order issued by President Clinton characterizes 
the conservation duty as a “trustee and stewardship” responsibility: “[f ]ish and 
wildlife will not prosper without high-quality habitat, and without fish and 
wildlife, traditional uses of refuges cannot be sustained . The Refuge System will 
continue to conserve and enhance the quality and diversity of fish and wildlife 
habitat within refuges .” Exec . Order No . 12996, 61 Fed . Reg . 13647 (Mar . 25, 
1996) (emphasis added) .
306 . Robert L . Fischman, From Words to Action:The Impact and Legal Status of the 
2006 National Wildlife Refuge System Management Policies, 26 Stan . Envtl . 
L .J . 77, 79 (2007) .
307 . 16 U .S .C .§ 668ee(1) .
308 . 50 C .F .R . § 26 .41 (2012) .
309 . Id. § 26 .41(d) .
310 . Id. § 29 .1 (2012) . The FWS’s manual for wildlife refuges defines economic use 
as “[a]ny activity involving the use of a refuge or its resources for a profit .” U .S . 
Fish & Wildlife Serv ., Refuge Manual, 5 FW § 17 .6(D) (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Refuge Manual] . In a separate FWS policy, the term “refuge management 
economic activity” is defined as “[a] refuge management activity on a national 
wildlife refuge that results in generation of a commodity which is or can be 
sold for income or revenue or traded for goods or services .” Id. at 603 FW 
§  2 .6(N) (2000) . See Del . Audubon Soc’y, Inc . v . Salazar, 829 F . Supp . 2d 
273, 289–90 (D . Del . 2011) (finding that a dune restoration project was not 
an economic use, where sand would not be sold but would be used to restore 
beaches and dunes) .
311 . 50 C .F .R . § 29 .1 . See Del . Audubon Soc’y ., Inc . v . Sec’y of the U .S . Dep’t of 
the Interior, 612 F . Supp . 2d 442 (D . Del . 2009) (enjoining decision to allow 
cooperative farming and farming with genetically modified crops in a refuge 
without first preparing a written compatibility determination); Stevens Cnty . 
v . U .S . Dep’t of Interior, 507 F . Supp . 2d 1127, 1133–35 (E .D . Wash . 2007) 
(FWS’s determination that livestock grazing was not a compatible use was en-
titled to deference; although some studies showed the grazing could have a 
positive impact on habitat, other studies demonstrated the negative effects of 
grazing on migratory bird populations and riparian habitats, and site-specific 
studies demonstrated that grazing materially interfered with wildlife manage-
ment on the refuge); see also Wilderness Soc’y v . Babbitt, 5 F .3d 383 (9th Cir . 
1993) (remanding FWS’s decision to renew grazing permits where the FWS 
failed to consider the incompatibility of grazing with refuge purposes, even 
in the face of report of the refuge manager that current grazing practices were 
harming fish and wildlife habitats) .
312 . See 50 C .F .R § 26 .41 (2012) (“We will usually complete compatibility deter-
minations as part of the comprehensive conservation plan or step-down man-
agement plan process for individual uses, specific use programs, or groups of 
related uses described in the plan”) .
313 . Id . § 25 .21(f ) (2012); see also id. § 25 .21(b) (“We may open a national wildlife 
refuge for any refuge use, or expand, renew, or extend an existing refuge use 
conditions or significant new information concerning the 
effects of the use exist .314 The FWS Manual emphasizes that 
the first goal of a CCP is “[t]o ensure that wildlife comes first 
in the National Wildlife Refuge System .”315
Although recreational impacts could undercut the con-
servation mission, the statute identifies wildlife-dependent 
recreation, such as hunting and fishing, as a preferred (pre-
sumptively compatible) use of the Wildlife Refuge System .316 
Together, the statute and the FWS management policies 
guard against this possibility by imposing biological integ-
rity, diversity, and environmental health as criteria for decid-
ing whether to allow wildlife-dependent recreation .317
A potential deficiency in the statutory scheme is the fail-
ure to apply the compatibility requirement to the FWS’s own 
management actions . In Fund for Animals v. Clark,318 the 
district court held that the FWS had no statutory duty to 
conduct a compatibility analysis of its feeding programs for 
bison and elk in the National Elk Refuge because activities 
conducted by refuge managers were not refuge “uses” within 
the meaning of the Act .319 The court interpreted the statutory 
list of “uses” governed by the compatibility requirement to be 
limited to those performed by third parties or the public .320 
It bolstered this conclusion by referencing section 668dd(c), 
which it construed as “specifically exempt[ing] from the com-
patibility requirement actions taken by ‘persons authorized 
to manage’ the refuge area .”321 The FWS has since adopted 
a regulation defining “refuge use” as use “by the public or 
other non-National Wildlife Refuge System entity .”322
Despite this gap, the stewardship responsibilities embed-
ded in the broadly applicable statutory conservation man-
date should guide decisionmakers to prevent impairment of 
only after the Refuge Manager determines that it is a compatible use and not 
inconsistent with any applicable law”) .
314 . Id . § 25 .21(f ) .
315 . Refuge Manual, 602 FW § 3 .3 .A (2000) . Comprehensive conservation plans 
are required by 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(e) and 50 C .F .R . § 26 .41 .
316 . See 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(3)(a)(iii) (2006) (“Wildlife-dependent recreational uses 
may be authorized on a refuge when they are compatible and not inconsistent 
with public safety . Except for consideration of consistency with State laws and 
regulations as provided for in subsection (m) of this section, no other deter-
minations or findings are required   .   .   .  for wildlife-dependent recreation to 
occur .”) . Wildlife-dependent uses include hunting, fishing, wildlife observa-
tion and photography, and environmental education and interpretation . Id . 
§ 668ee(2) (2012) .
317 . Fischman, supra note 306, at 111–12 (citing Refuge Manual, 605 FW 
§§ 1 .13(B), 1 .8(B), (D)(3) (2000)) . See also Appropriate Refuge Uses, U .S . Fish 
& Wildlife Serv ., http://www .fws .gov/policy/601fw3 .html (last updated 
April 16, 2001) .
318 . Fund for Animals v . Clark, 27 F . Supp . 2d 8 (D .D .C . 1998) .
319 . Id. at 12 .
320 . Id. at 11 (citing 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(1)(A)-(B)) . A district court in Delaware 
found that a FWS dune restoration project was within the agency’s “sound 
professional judgment” and upheld the FWS’s compatibility determination, 
without analyzing whether the FWS was statutorily required to meet the com-
patibility requirement . Del . Audubon Soc’y v . Salazar, 829 F . Supp . 2d 273, 
287–90 (D . Del . 2011) .
321 . Clark, 27 F . Supp . 2d at 11 (citing 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(c)) . Subsection 668dd(c) 
sets forth the general prohibitions against any persons disturbing or possessing 
“any real or personal property of the United States, including natural growth, 
in any area of the System,” or taking or possessing any wild animals within 
refuges, “unless such activities are performed by persons authorized to manage 
such area, or unless such activities are permitted  .  .  . [as compatible uses] under 
subsection (d) .  .  .  .” 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(c) (emphasis added) .
322 . See 50 C .F .R . § 25 .12(a) (2012) .
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refuge resources .323 Courts have been willing to uphold FWS 
decisions to limit access to protect refuge resources,324 but 
they have been equally inclined to uphold FWS decisions to 
allow use .325 Thus, discretion can cut both ways . Yet, as indi-
cated in Part IV below, the NWRSIA’s directive to “ensure 
that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental 
health of the System are maintained for the benefit of pres-
ent and future generations,”326 coupled with its compatibility 
requirement, is useful in the effort to supply a meaningful 
definition of degradation under the CWA .
5.	 Multiple	Use,	Sustained	Yield	Management	by	
the	Forest	Service
The U .S . Forest Service manages the lands under its juris-
diction under a multiple use, sustained yield mandate that 
is less preservation-oriented than the management regimes 
discussed above .327 Yet the organic statute for the Forest Ser-
vice provides some protection against degradation of certain 
resources, and therefore may be relevant to achieving the 
goals of the antidegradation policy .
The management and planning provisions of the National 
Forest Management Act of 1976 (“NFMA”) guide the Forest 
Service in seeking an appropriate mix of uses in the National 
Forest System .328 The statute requires forest plans to assure 
that land productivity is not substantially and permanently 
impaired .329 In addition, forest plans must prevent irrevers-
ible damage to soil, slope, or other watershed conditions and 
protect streams and other bodies of water from detrimental 
changes if harvests are likely to adversely affect water condi-
tions or fish habitat .330 According to the courts, Congress 
delegated to the Forest Service the discretion to balance these 
protections while providing for multiple uses of the forests .331 
323 . Fischman, supra note 306, at 111 .
324 . See Niobrara River Ranch, L .L .C . v . Huber, 277 F . Supp . 2d 1020 (D . Neb . 
2003), aff’d, 373 F .3d 881 (8th Cir . 2004) (affirming FWS’s decision to limit 
recreational rafting and canoeing in a refuge) .
325 . See Wilderness Soc’y v . U .S . Fish & Wildlife Serv ., 316 F .3d 913 (9th Cir . 
2003) (upholding a decision that a salmon aquaculture project within a refuge 
in Alaska was compatible with refuge purposes), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated, 340 F .3d 768 (9th Cir . 2003), amended on reh’g en banc, 360 F .3d 1374 
(9th Cir . 2004) (finding that aquaculture project violated the Wilderness Act 
without resolving whether the project also violated the NWRSIA) . In Fund for 
Animals v. Hall, the court found that the FWS violated NEPA (but not the 
NWRSIA) by failing to consider the cumulative impacts of recreational hunt-
ing in sixty refuges, but on remand, the FWS cured this defect by considering 
cumulative impacts in its revised refuge-level assessments . Fund for Animals v . 
Hall, 777 F . Supp . 2d 92, 92 (D .D .C . 2011) .
326 . 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2006) .
327 . See 1 Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 303, at § 6:17 (describing mandate 
and discretion of the Forest Service) . Another multiple-use statute, the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act, requires that the BLM “by regulation or 
otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion of the [public] lands .” 42 U .S .C . § 1732(b) (2006) . The statute fails to 
define these terms, and the regulatory history has taken several turns . See 43 
C .F .R . § 3809 .0-5(k) (1981); 43 C .F .R . § 3809 .5 (2001); Mineral Pol’y Ctr . v . 
Norton, 292 F . Supp . 2d 30, 40 (D .D .C . 2003) . A watered-down interpreta-
tion of “undue degradation” was upheld in Theodore Roosevelt Conservation 
P’ship v . Salazar, 661 F .3d 66 (D .C . Cir . 2011) .
328 . See National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub . L . No . 94-588, 90 Stat . 
2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U .S .C .) .
329 . 16 U .S .C. § 1604(g)(3)(C) (2006) .
330 . Id . § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i), (iii) .
331 . Sierra Club v . Espy, 38 F .3d 792, 800 (5th Cir . 1994) .
As a result, the courts have been loath to upset the multiple 
use, sustained yield agenda .332
NFMA also requires that forest plans “provide for diversity 
of plant and animal communities .”333 This imprecise provi-
sion imposes weak constraints on Forest Service discretion .334 
The courts have generally refused to require any precise 
level of diversity335 and have tended to defer to the agency’s 
technical expertise in applying the diversity requirement,336 
although less so in cases involving earlier versions of the 
agency’s implementing regulations that contained relatively 
specific constraints on forest management .337
The general nature of NFMA’s broad constraints, and the 
judicial reluctance in many cases to rely on them to halt tim-
ber, grazing, and other projects detrimental to resource integ-
rity, make them poor models for strengthening the CWA’s 
antidegradation policy . Nevertheless, the focus in the diver-
sity regulations on ecosystem characteristics and biological 
communities can provide useful guidance for defining deg-
radation and for identifying, restoring, and maintaining the 
integrity of important aquatic ecosystems, especially those 
with “exceptional ecological significance,” through antideg-
radation requirements .338
332 . Id.; Lamb v . Thompson, 265 F .3d 1038, 1048–50 (10th Cir . 2001); Wilder-
ness Soc’y v . Thomas, 188 F .3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir . 1999); Mountain States 
Legal Found . v . Glickman, 92 F .3d 1228, 1238 (D .C . Cir . 1996) .
333 . 16 U .S .C . § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2006) .
334 . 3 Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 303, § 34:15 .
335 . For notable exceptions, see Seattle Audubon Soc’y v . Moseley, 798 F . Supp . 
1473 (W .D . Wash . 1992), aff’d, 998 F .2d 699 (9th Cir . 1993) (enjoining tim-
ber sales on grounds that the diversity duty requires planning for the entire 
biological community, such that a management plan that would preserve a 
management indicator species such as the owl, only to exterminate other spe-
cies, would conflict with the duty); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v . Moseley, 798 F . 
Supp . 1484 (W .D . Wash . 1992) (similar) .
336 . See, e.g., Forest Guardians v . U .S . Forest Serv ., 641 F .3d 423, 440–43 (10th 
Cir . 2011) (upholding the agency’s approval of a timber sale even though pop-
ulation levels for a management indicator species were below the minimum 
viable population threshold and were declining, and the project called for de-
struction of additional habitat); Sierra Club v . Robertson, 810 F . Supp . 1021, 
1028 (W .D . Ark . 1992), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 28 F .3d 
753 (8th Cir . 1994) . See also Sierra Club v . Espy, 38 F .3d at 800 (concluding 
that the protection of diversity “means something less than preservation of the 
status quo but something more than eradication of species”) .
337 . From 1982 to 2005, the Forest Service’s regulations implementing NFMA’s 
diversity provision required sufficient habitat to support viable populations 
of wildlife and fish species—“a minimum number of reproductive individu-
als   .   .   . well distributed so that those individuals can interact with others in 
the planning area .” 36 C .F .R . § 219 .19 (1982) . In 2005, the regulation was 
replaced with much more general provisions on ecological, social, and eco-
nomic sustainability . 36 C .F .R . §§ 219 .10, 219 .19- .21 (2011) . In 2012, the 
agency amended its planning regulations again . The new version adopts “a 
complementary ecosystem and species-specific approach to maintaining the 
diversity of plant and animal communities and the persistence of native species 
in the plan area .” National Forest System Land and Resource Management 
Planning Final Rule, 77 Fed . Reg . 21162, 21212 (Apr . 9, 2012) (to be codi-
fied at 36 C .F .R . pt . 219 .9(a)) . Among other things, the regulations require 
each forest plan to include standards or guidelines “to maintain or restore the 
diversity of ecosystems and habitat types throughout the plan area,” including 
components to maintain or restore “(i) Key characteristics associated with ter-
restrial and aquatic ecosystem types; (ii) Rare aquatic and terrestrial plant and 
animal communities; and (iii) The diversity of native tree species similar to that 
existing in the plan area .” Id . at 21,265 . It remains to be seen whether the 2012 
regulations meaningfully constrain agency discretion .
338 . Additional guidance might be drawn from the more stringent constraints on 
approval of activities that would adversely affect National Forest wilderness 
study areas in state-specific wilderness legislation . See, e.g., Montana Wilder-
ness Study Act §  3(a), Pub . L . No . 95-150, 91 Stat . 1243 (1977); Russell 
Country Sportsmen v . U .S . Forest Serv ., 668 F .3d 1037, 1042–44 (9th Cir . 
Copyright © 2013 Environmental Law Institute® and The George Washington University Law School, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission.
Winter 2013 IMPROVING WATER QUALITY ANTIDEGRADATION POLICIES 21
B.	 The	Lessons	of	Federal	Lands	for	Protecting	Water	
Resources	Against	Degradation
Among the federal land management statutes discussed in 
the previous section, the Park Service Organic Act and the 
NWRSIA seem to provide the most appropriate guidance 
for strengthening the CWA’s antidegradation requirements . 
Although the WSRA can supply some lessons for the CWA, 
its aspirations for maintaining free-flowing rivers are not as 
specific as the non-impairment provisions of those other two 
laws with respect to anything but dams . Additionally, its pro-
visions are not as closely related to protecting the biological, 
chemical, or physical integrity of the system .339 As a result, 
the WSRA remains an underutilized tool and, arguably, a 
less optimal analogue . The Wilderness Act already protects 
the components of high-quality waters that run through 
federally designated wilderness areas by prohibiting, with 
limited exceptions, activities that would detract from wil-
derness values, including commercial activities that might 
otherwise threaten water quality .340 The Act provides a less 
than ideal model for protecting high-quality waters outside 
the boundaries of wilderness areas, however, because a ban 
on all discharges from industrial and commercial activities 
would impose unrealistic constraints that upset the balance 
between environmental protection and economic growth 
that Congress endorsed in 1987 by codifying EPA’s existing 
antidegradation policy .341 As for the NFMA, its production-
oriented focus and delegation of sweeping agency discre-
tion are not particularly helpful to efforts to strengthen the 
CWA’s antidegradation policy .342
The Park Service Organic Act’s goals and mandates could 
be tailored to provide appropriately enhanced protection for 
the nation’s high-quality waters . The Act aims to conserve 
and prevent impairment of park scenery, wildlife, and other 
natural resources for the enjoyment of both present and 
2011) (holding that this mandate gave the agency the authority not only to 
maintain, but also to enhance the wild, natural characteristics by closing off 
pre-existing routes to motor vehicles) . Although the court reasoned that “[t]he 
Act simply requires the Service to preserve a study area’s wilderness character 
against decline,” it found that “[e]nhancement of wilderness character is fully 
consistent with the Study Act’s mandate, although the Study Act does not re-
quire it .” Id. at 1042 . The Idaho district court reached a similar conclusion un-
der the Wyoming Wilderness Act in Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Timchak, No . 
CV-06-04-E-BLW, 2006 WL 3386731, at *3–6 (D . Idaho 2006), overturning 
a decision to permit increased heli-skiing in a WSA because the Service failed 
to show that available opportunities for solitude would be maintained despite 
the increased use .
339 . Compare 16 U .S .C . § 1271 (2012), with 16 U .S .C . § 1 (2006) and 16 U .S .C . 
§ 668dd(a)(2) (2006) .
340 . Nat’l Wild & Scenic Rivers System, Implementing the Wild & Sce-
nic Rivers Act: Authorities & Roles of Key Federal Agencies (1999), 
available at http://www .rivers .gov/rivers/documents/federal-agency-roles .pdf 
(“River-administering agencies are directed to cooperate with the EPA and 
appropriate state water pollution control agencies ‘for the purpose of elimi-
nating or diminishing the pollution of waters of the river’ (Section 12(c) of 
the WSRA) . The CWA, Floodplain and Wetlands Executive Orders, and the 
SDWA provide EPA’s authority to protect water quality .”) .
341 . Ross W . Gorte, Cong . Research Serv ., R41649, Wilderness Laws: 
Statutory Provisions & Prohibited & Permitted Uses (2011), available 
at http://www .wilderness .net/NWPS/documents/Wilderness%20Laws-Statu-
tory%20Provisions%20and%20Prohibited%20and%20Permitted%20Uses .
pdf; U .S . Envtl . Prot . Agency, supra note 39 .
342 . See supra Part III .A .5 .
future generations .343 Park Service policies recognize that 
the conservation of plants and animals entails not just pro-
tecting individual species but maintaining them “as parts of 
the natural ecosystems of parks .”344 The Service also sees the 
conservation of “evolving genetic diversity” as part of its mis-
sion .345 The CWA’s antidegradation policy could be amended 
to define “degradation” as impairment of water quality in 
a covered water body that either results in impairment or 
threatened impairment of an existing use—especially fish-
ing, swimming, or higher uses—or adversely affects the 
ecological resilience of the water body, such that its capac-
ity to continue to provide important ecosystem services is 
reduced . Such a dual standard would measure degradation 
by two yardsticks—one that focuses on suitability for par-
ticular human uses and another that focuses on the role of 
the affected water body in the ecosystem of which it is a part .
Yet the Organic Act is not perfect, and impairment of 
resources within the National Park System has occurred .346 
Like the rest of North America, the System has experienced 
sharp declines in the diversity and abundance of animal and 
plant species .347 The culprits are found, for the most part, 
outside of park boundaries on adjacent federal, state, and 
private lands .348 Such “external threats   .   .   .  could destabi-
lize park wildlife populations and critical ecosystem services, 
such as clean water and flood control .”349 In particular, a 
2009 National Parks Science Committee Report observed 
that there must be far greater protection for freshwater sys-
tems if parks are to remain a “haven  .  .  . for once-widespread 
species and ecosystems .”350 The “external threats” problem 
is relevant to the antidegradation policy because a Tier 3 
ONRW river that runs through a wilderness area or a park, 
for example, may have segments that are not given Tier 3 
protections, and those segments may be degraded in ways 
that adversely affect the Tier 3 segment .351
343 . 16 U .S .C . § 1 .
344 . Management Policies 2006, supra note 267 , § 4 .4 .1 . See id . § 1 .4 .7 .2 (“The 
Service will also strive to ensure that park resources and values are passed on to 
future generations in a condition that is as good as, or better than, the condi-
tions that exist today .”) .
345 . Id . § 4 .4 .1 .2 (“The Service will strive to protect the full range of genetic types 
(genotypes) of native plant and animal populations in the parks by perpetuat-
ing natural evolutionary processes and minimizing human interference with 
evolving genetic diversity .”) . Compare NWRSIA, 16 U .S .C . § 668dd (2006) 
(explicitly recognizing “restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources 
and their habitats” as a mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System 
“where appropriate”) .
346 . Keiter, supra note 271, at 92 .
347 . See Nat’l Parks Sci . Comm ., D-1589A, National Park Service Science in 
the 21st Century 1 (2d ed . 2009) [hereinafter Nat’l Parks Sci . Comm .] 
(observing that “national parks with decreased biological diversity and dimin-
ished natural systems can in no way be considered unimpaired,” and arguing 
that establishing a “fully constituted science program” is essential to the non-
impairment mandate) . See also Debra L . Donahue, Trampling the Public Trust, 
37 B .C . Envtl . Aff . L . Rev . 257, 264–65 (2010) (describing how the loss 
of a top predator has had devastating ripple effects in Yellowstone, Yosemite, 
Wind Cave, Zion, and Olympic National Parks and in Jasper National Park 
in Canada) .
348 . Keiter, supra note 271, at 92 .
349 . Id .
350 . Nat’l Parks Sci . Comm ., supra note 347, at 3 .
351 . See, e.g., Arkansas v . Oklahoma, 503 U .S . 91, 91 (1992) (approving discharge 
by sewage treatment facility into a portion of the Illinois River in Arkansas that 
is upstream from a segment within Oklahoma that had been designated as a 
scenic river) .
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Still, water quality within the boundaries of the National 
Park System seems to be at least somewhat better than out-
side of the System . In 1993, the Park Service established a 
nationwide goal that by 2008 more than ninety-nine percent 
of streams and rivers managed by the Service would meet 
state and federal water quality standards adopted under the 
CWA .352 To achieve this goal, the Service, in partnership 
with the U .S . Geological Survey, is preparing inventories of 
water quality in Park units .353 Not surprisingly, water quality 
within and among units varies significantly, making gener-
alizations difficult .354 For example, water bodies within Yel-
lowstone National Park “continue to be of high quality,”355 
but in the more populous Mid-Atlantic Region, twenty-one 
percent of the ONRWs were impaired and none had attained 
all of their designated uses .356 System-wide, the Park Service 
has fallen short of its ninety-nine percent water quality com-
pliance goal, but it appears to be taking steps in the right 
direction under the Organic Act and, where applicable, the 
ONRW provisions of the antidegradation policy .357 Yet, the 
existence of significant noncompliance even in ONRWs 
highlights the need for the imposition of restoration respon-
sibilities on states whose high quality, or otherwise outstand-
ing, waters violate water quality standards or other aspects of 
the antidegradation policy .358
The NWRSIA can serve as another appropriate guide-
post for improving the CWA’s antidegradation program . 
In one sense, at least, it may be even more useful than the 
Park Service Organic Act . Economic uses of wildlife refuges 
may be allowed, but decisionmakers are required to make an 
explicit finding that such uses will help achieve either ref-
uge purposes or the overall mission of the Wildlife Refuge 
System, and also to prevent such uses from impairing refuge 
resources .359 Moreover, the statute unequivocally directs the 
FWS “to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance, 
healthy populations of fish, wildlife, and plants .”360 Like the 
Organic Act, the NWRSIA promotes the biological diver-
sity and integrity of the system . The NWRSIA, however, 
includes more substantive management criteria with rela-
tively rich detail, and the Refuge Management Policy adds 
even more detail .361 As Professor Robert L . Fischman has 
observed, the Refuge Management Policy elevates promo-
352 . Frank A . Deviney Jr . et al ., Water Quality Monitoring in the Mid-Atlantic Net-
work of the National Park Service, App . 4, p . 15 (2005) (citing Goal Ia4A), 
available at http://science .nature .nps .gov/im/units/midn/Phase_1_Report/
Appendix_4 ._WQ_Scoping_Report .pdf .
353 . Freshwater Resources Management, Nat’l Park Serv ., http://www .nature .nps .
gov/rm77/freshwater/waterresources .cfm (last updated Feb . 5, 2004) .
354 . Id.
355 . Nat’l Park Serv ., NPS/GRYN/NRDS—2011/310, Greater Yellowstone 
Network Water Quality Monitoring Annual Report, January 2009–
December 2009 ix (2011), available at http://www .greateryellowstonescience .
org/subproducts/214/7 .
356 . Deviney et al ., supra note 352, at 2 .
357 . Water Quality Program, Nat’l Park Serv ., http://www .nature .nps .gov/water/
waterquality/ (last updated Feb . 2, 2012); see also Baseline Water Quality Data 
Inventory & Analysis Reports, Nat’l Park Serv ., http://www .nature .nps .gov/
water/horizon .cfm (last updated Jul . 2, 2012) .
358 . Deviney et al ., supra note 352, at 17 .
359 . Fischman, supra note 306, at 111; see supra notes 310–11 .
360 . 16 U .S .C .A . § 668ee(4) (2006) (emphasis added) .
361 . Fischman, supra note 306, at 111 .
tion of the Wildlife Refuge System’s conservation mission, 
supported by the integrity-diversity-health mandate, above 
the promotion of wildlife-dependent recreation .362 This level 
of detail cabins the agency’s discretion, and empowers citi-
zens and courts to ensure implementation of the Act’s con-
servation/integrity requirement .
Drawing on the NWRSIA example, the CWA’s antideg-
radation policy could declare that discharges from new or 
expanded economic uses that would adversely impact Tier 2 
waters cannot be permitted absent a specific finding that the 
new or expanded use meets certain clearly delineated cri-
teria demonstrating its necessity to the community or the 
state . In addition, the antidegradation policy could declare 
the issuance of permits involving discharges of specified pol-
lutants (or amounts of pollutants) to be incompatible (or 
presumptively incompatible) with the maintenance of the 
high-quality waters protected by the policy .363 The policy 
could distinguish among the tiers of water bodies by limit-
ing this approach to new or expanded discharges into Tier 
1 waters, but extending it to all discharges, including exist-
ing discharges, for Tier 3 (and perhaps Tier 2) waters . This 
approach resembles the prohibition in FWS regulations on 
approval of certain uses of the wildlife refuges absent a show-
ing of compatibility .364
IV. Recommendations for Strengthening 
the Antidegradation Program
Building on forty years of experience with the CWA’s anti-
degradation policy, and on the comparative strengths and 
weaknesses of the CAA and federal land management stat-
utes, we offer four recommendations to improve the antideg-
radation policy . Each of the recommendations responds to 
one of the deficiencies in the antidegradation program iden-
tified in Part II .C above .
First, we recommend a federal regulation requiring states 
to designate waters within national parks and wildlife ref-
uges and other waters of “exceptional ecological significance” 
as ONRWs in their WQS inventories .365 The current regula-
tions fail to provide any direction regarding the designation 
processes, beyond referencing parks and refuges; as a result, 
there is inadequate protection for some of the nation’s most 
362 . Id . at 112, citing U .S . Fish & Wildlife Serv ., Refuge Manual, 605 
§§ 1 .13(B), 1 .8(B), (D)(3) (2000) . See also U .S . Fish & Wildlife Serv ., Ref-
uge Management 605 §§ 1 .9–1 .10, available at http://policy .fws .gov/ser600 .
html .
363 . Under the presumptive incompatibility approach, the burden would shift to 
permit applicants to demonstrate that discharge of the pollutants or amounts 
involved would not result in impermissible degradation, and therefore would 
be compatible with the policy .
364 . See supra notes 312–15 and accompanying text .
365 . See Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed . Reg . 36742, 36786 (July 
7, 1998) . EPA defines “waters of exceptional ecological significance” as those 
“water bodies which are important, unique, or sensitive ecologically, but whose 
water quality, as measured by the traditional characteristics (dissolved oxygen, 
pH, etc .) may not be particularly high, such as thermal springs . Waters of 
exceptional ecological significance also include waters whose characteristics 
cannot adequately be described by these parameters .” Id.; see also Water Qual-
ity Standards Regulation, 48 Fed . Reg . at 51403; Brawer, supra note 127, at 
20–21 (recommending more well-defined processes for citizen petition and 
designation of ONRWs) .
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important aquatic resources .366 In 1998, EPA suggested in 
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that states and 
tribes should be required to establish a nomination pro-
cess with criteria guidelines so that interested citizens or 
groups could petition for designation of certain waters as 
ONRWs .367 The New Mexico experience demonstrates how 
public involvement can promote the process of protect-
ing high-quality waters if citizens have a viable procedural 
mechanism and if sufficient criteria are delineated to guide 
agency responses and allow meaningful judicial review .368 
These criteria would elaborate on the meaning of “excep-
tional ecological significance,” perhaps using factors similar 
to those by which the 2012 Forest Service planning regula-
tions measure ecosystem integrity .369
In addition, states should be required to take concrete 
steps, including the reduction of aggregate discharges, to 
restore the quality of Tier 3 and other degraded, but oth-
erwise high-quality, waters covered by the antidegradation 
policy . EPA would be obliged to determine during each 
triennial review of state water quality standards whether 
states have complied with this responsibility . EPA’s failure to 
require restoration when the policy demands it would then 
be judicially reviewable .370 The imposition of a restoration 
mandate would be consistent with the CWA’s overarching 
goal of “restor[ing]” as well as maintaining the integrity of 
the waters of the United States .371
Second, EPA should promulgate a regulatory definition of 
“degradation .” Formalizing EPA’s informal guidance direct-
ing the regions to consider “assimilative capacity” would be 
a step in the right direction . This step, however, would not 
go far enough because it may result in new or increased dis-
charges on large lakes and rivers whose assimilative capacity 
appears to be great, but may not in fact be as great as pre-
sumed, or whose aquatic environment may not respond in 
a predictable fashion to pollutants . In addition, a mandate 
to consider assimilative capacity in isolation may still allow 
multiple discharges over time to severely affect the integrity 
of a water body without ever undergoing a comprehensive 
antidegradation review .372 Looking to the NWRSIA373 and 
the Organic Act374 for guideposts, the new definition should 
366 . Adler, supra note 109, at 287 .
367 . Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed . Reg . at 36786 .
368 . See supra notes 142–49 and accompanying text .
369 . See supra note 337 and accompanying text (regarding National Forest Sys-
tem Land Management Planning, 36 C .F .R . § 219 .8(a)(1) (2011) (listing as 
factors relevant to the protection of ecosystem integrity (i) interdependence 
of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, (ii) an area’s contributions to ecological 
conditions within the broader landscape influenced by the area, (iii) conditions 
in the broader landscape that may influence the sustainability of resources and 
ecosystems within the affected area, (iv) system drivers such as dominant eco-
logical processes, disturbance regimes, and stressors, such as natural succession, 
wildland fire, invasive species, and climate change; (v) the ability of terrestrial 
and aquatic ecosystems to adapt to change, and (vi) opportunities for land-
scape scale restoration) .
370 . See 5 U .S .C . §§ 704, 706(1) (2006) (authorizing review of final agency ac-
tion and of an agency’s failure to act to fulfill discrete statutory or regulatory 
mandates) .
371 . CWA § 101(a), 33 U .S .C . § 1251(a) (2006) .
372 . Ohio Valley Envtl . Coal . v . Horinko, 279 F . Supp . 2d 732, 752 (S .D . W . Va . 
2003) .
373 . 16 U .S .C . § 668dd(a) (2006) .
374 . 16 U .S .C . § 1 (2006) .
include substantive criteria and thresholds or triggers to guide 
the permitting process to better meet the goals of the anti-
degradation policy and the CWA as a whole and to enable 
meaningful citizen involvement and judicial review . As sug-
gested above, drawing on the analogy to the Park Service 
experience, “degradation” could be defined as impairment 
of water quality that either results in loss or threatened loss 
of an existing or potentially viable use—especially fishing, 
swimming, and higher uses—or adversely affects the ecolog-
ical resilience of the water body such that its capacity to con-
tinue to provide important ecosystem services is reduced .375 
In addition, based on the NWRSIA example, the issuance 
of permits involving discharges of specified pollutants (or 
amounts of pollutants) could be declared incompatible (or 
presumptively incompatible) with maintenance of the high-
quality waters protected by the antidegradation policy .376
Third, states should be required to extend their antideg-
radation programs to nonpoint source runoff .377 One of the 
biggest holes in the antidegradation policy is the failure to 
regulate nonpoint sources that degrade water quality .378 
States have the discretion to extend their antidegradation 
requirements to nonpoint sources, but it appears that, at 
present, states cannot be forced to do so .379 Even when state 
antidegradation requirements nominally apply to nonpoint 
sources, those requirements sometimes effectively have no 
substantive content .380 As noted above, a few courts have 
upheld EPA’s approval of a state’s water quality standards 
that exempted nonpoint source discharges from antidegra-
dation requirements .381 However, EPA once took the posi-
tion that “[n]onpoint source activities are not exempt from 
the provisions of the antidegradation policy .”382 A persuasive 
argument can be made that EPA should reinvigorate this 
position, and indeed that it has an affirmative duty to ensure 
that state programs for nonpoint source pollution—includ-
ing antidegradation programs—do not defeat the CWA’s 
objectives .383 Some judicial interpretations of the CWA 
support state efforts to control nonpoint source pollution 
through antidegradation requirements .384 The water quality 
standard-setting process applies to waters polluted by both 
375 . See supra Part III .B; see also Hines, supra note 8 (quoting Fed . Water Pollu-
tion Control Admin ., U .S . Dep’t of Interior, Guidelines for Estab-
lishing Water Quality Standards for Interstate Waters 5, 7 (1966)) 
(“[i]n no case will standards providing for less than existing water quality be 
acceptable”; standards shall provide for “[t]he maintenance and protection of 
quality and use or uses of water now of a higher quality or of a quality suitable for 
present and potential uses”) (emphasis added) .
376 . See supra notes 363–64 and accompanying text .
377 . Modesitt, supra note 207, at 220–21 .
378 . Id.
379 . Id. at 195, 221 (assessing application of state antidegradation programs to 
nonpoint source pollution) .
380 . See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v . Rogers, 141 F .3d 803, 810 (8th Cir . 
1998) (concluding that “the Arkansas statewide policy for nonpoint sources is 
so broadly stated that the Forest Service was not arbitrary or capricious in con-
cluding this policy added nothing to its compliance obligations under federal 
environmental laws”) .
381 . See supra note 169 and accompanying text .
382 . Questions & Answers, supra note 26, at 6 (emphasis added); see U .S . Envtl . 
Prot . Agency, supra note 39, at § 4 .8 .
383 . CWA § 101(a), 33 U .S .C . § 1251(a) (2006) .
384 . See supra Part II .B .1 .
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point source and nonpoint source pollution .385 Further, EPA 
regulations already require the states to “achieve[]  .  .  . cost-
effective and reasonable best management practices for non-
point source control .”386
Fourth, to address EPA’s failure to provide consistent fol-
low through on requiring states to properly implement the 
antidegradation policy, mandatory state planning and assess-
ment responsibilities could be added . For example, states 
might be required to consider as part of the triennial water 
quality standard revision process whether the designation of 
additional Tier 1, 2, or 3 waters is appropriate and document 
the results of that assessment . In addition, the states should 
be required to explain any refusal to designate ONRWs . EPA 
would have to consider the state’s explanation in deciding 
whether to approve or disapprove state water quality stan-
dards as consistent with CWA requirements .387 EPA deter-
minations would then be judicially reviewable . The CWA 
already requires states to engage in a continuing planning 
process that includes “adequate implementation   .   .   .  for 
revised or new water quality standards,” which of course 
include the antidegradation policy .388 State planning respon-
sibilities are far less rigorous under the CWA than they are 
under the CAA, but efforts by EPA during the Clinton 
Administration to mandate planning obligations to achieve 
water quality standards similar to state implementation 
plan duties under the CAA ran into political opposition .389 
385 . See CWA § 303, 33 U .S .C . § 1313 (2006) (drawing no distinction between 
pollution from point sources and nonpoint sources); Nw . Envtl . Advocates v . 
City of Portland, 56 F .3d 979, 986 (9th Cir . 1995) (“[N]owhere does Congress 
evidence an intent to preclude the enforcement of water quality standards that 
have not been translated into effluent discharge limitations .”) .
386 . 40 C .F .R . § 131 .12(a)(2) (2011); see David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N .Y .U . 
L . Rev . 294, 326–27 (2006) (stating that “best practices regulation is currently 
the only form of federal regulation of runoff or ‘nonpoint source’ pollution”) .
387 . CWA§ 303(c)(4), 33 U .S .C . § 1313(c)(4) .
388 . Id . § 1313(e)(3)(F) .
389 . See Oliver A . Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and 
the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ELR 10208, 10213 (Mar . 2011) .
Enhancement of selected aspects of state water quality stan-
dard implementation, such as those relating to compliance 
with the antidegradation policy, is worth another look .
V. Conclusion
The four reforms suggested in Part IV would promote the 
primary goals of the antidegradation policy, especially pro-
viding a margin of safety, protecting high-value natural 
resources, preventing the development of pollution havens, 
and balancing environmental goals and economic growth 
opportunities .390 These reforms would also do much to 
move the nation’s water bodies beyond the “least common 
denominator” of fishable/swimmable waters and toward the 
CWA’s overarching goal of maintaining, as well as restoring, 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of aquatic 
environments . Efforts to prevent degradation of high-qual-
ity water bodies are analogous to efforts to prevent impair-
ment of clean airsheds and ecologically important natural 
resources found on the federal lands . The public land man-
agement statutes, in particular, provide a host of widely 
divergent models for use and protection of natural resources . 
Statutory provisions that prevent impairment of the national 
parks and wildlife refuges could serve as models for strength-
ening the CWA’s antidegradation program .
390 . See supra Part I .C .
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